Force Atlas

IRGC Navy

نیروی دریایی سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy

IRAN · ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS · BRANCH

Part of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Iran Active
Assessed as of
2026-10-23
Reviewed
2026-10-29
Confidence
moderate
  • State affiliation · Iran
  • Vigil category device · not official insignia
Identity provenance

State affiliation: Iran.

Vigil category device — drawn from this record’s own domain, echelon and role. Not an official insignia.

In brief

The Revolutionary Guard's naval service and Iran's Gulf-facing navy — small craft, missiles and asymmetric methods rather than warships, and the institution most closely associated with pressure on the Strait of Hormuz.

Scope
Structure, role, lineage and links. 5 subordinate records published.
Subordination
Subordination confirmed
Sources
3 on the record
Record state
Partial
Broad area of activity
The Persian Gulf and the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz
Notable history
Where the Artesh Navy is conventional and oriented outward, the Guard Navy is asymmetric and oriented on the Gulf itself. It is built around large numbers of small fast craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, mining capability and boarding parties rather than around warships, and the division of emphasis between the two Iranian navies — the Guard inside the Gulf, the Artesh beyond it — is described consistently enough by analysts to be treated as an institutional pattern, though Iran has never published it as a boundary. It is the service whose name appears in reporting on tanker seizures, harassment of merchant traffic and the approaches to the strait, and it is the reason "the Iranian navy" is an ambiguous phrase in almost every account of a Gulf incident.
Strengths
A force designed for the specific geography it operates in: a narrow, shallow, crowded sea in which mass, dispersion and short ranges matter more than tonnage. Its methods are cheap, distributed and hard to eliminate by striking a small number of targets — which is precisely what makes maritime pressure a durable Iranian option even after heavy losses elsewhere.
Limitations
Its capabilities are coercive rather than decisive: they can raise the cost and the risk of using the strait, and the commercial withdrawal of war-risk cover in March 2026 shows how effective that can be, but they have not sealed the water and the strait has never been physically closed. Attribution is also a persistent problem for anyone assessing it — Iran denied targeting Gulf energy facilities in the same period that the Guard publicly claimed a tanker strike. In October 2026 the Guard moved from unclaimed pressure to claimed action: on 9 October it claimed a tanker strike for an "unauthorised route" and said action would no longer be limited to the strait, and the Guard navy claimed seven tankers attacked or mined overnight into 22 October, a claim a Central Command spokesperson called incorrect. Claims are carried as claims and none is counted. This record contains no vessels, no positions, no patrol patterns, no mining areas and no description of how any of it is conducted.

Related organisations

  • Artesh Navy Institutionally linked to · as of 2026-09 · moderate confidence

    The two Iranian navies are separate services under separate commands with a broadly separate division of labour — the Artesh Navy conventional and oriented outward past Hormuz, the Guard Navy asymmetric and oriented on the Gulf itself. The division is described consistently by analysts but has never been published as a formal boundary by Iran, and this module records it as an institutional pattern rather than a jurisdictional line.

Related locations

Strait of Hormuz: A statement about mission emphasis, not about presence. The Guard Navy's assigned area of emphasis is the Gulf and the approaches to the strait, which is what distinguishes it institutionally from the Artesh Navy. The strait's geography, traffic and access states are owned by this module's maritime records; nothing here adds a position, a patrol area or a pattern.

Dated structural changes

Campaigns

Campaigns naming this organisation as a participant. The campaign record owns the relationship and grades it; this list is computed.

  • The 2026 interstate war Opposing force · Since 28 February 2026 · moderate confidence · as of 2026-09

    The Gulf-facing service whose mission the closure of the strait and the pressure on shipping concern; no specific operation is attributed.

Key events

28 Feb 2026Associated formationmoderate confidence

Iran declares the Strait of Hormuz closed to normal commercial traffic

Iranian forces declare the strait closed and cross-strait traffic largely halts. Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and petroleum products moved through it in the 2025 baseline, together with close to a fifth of world LNG exports.

5 – 10 Oct 2026Reported participantmoderate confidence

The Revolutionary Guard claims a tanker strike for an “unauthorised route”, as Central Command declares the lanes open

Strikes on tankers continued through the first ten days of October: UKMTO reported a tanker damaged with an engine-room fire in the strait on 5 October, and on 6 October the Panama-flagged On Peace was struck about nine nautical miles off Limah and set on fire, with ten crew evacuated to Khasab by Oman's defence ministry and at least twelve of the nineteen injured by India's account. On 9 October the Revolutionary Guard claimed it had set the "Sun Shine" ablaze for using an "unauthorised route" in the strait's southern section, said action against "violating" vessels would no longer be limited to the strait, and said companies cooperating with the United States would be sanctioned and their ships targeted. Kpler counted seven commodity vessels through the strait on 6 October, the fewest since 23 July. The same day as the Guard's claim, Central Command said it had cleared mines from the main shipping lanes and declared them open to vessels not violating United States sanctions on Iran; on 10 October it said a United States fighter had disabled a vessel leaving an Iranian port, the fourth since the blockade of Iranian ports began on 14 July.

Assessed as of — 2026-10-23 Last reviewed — 2026-10-29

See this force in the structure Interactive: select this record and follow what connects to it.

Watch questions this formation bears on

Standing analytical questions whose evidence runs through this formation, each with its latest review. Derived from the Watch object, never restated here.

  • MilitaryDoes one headquarters command both of Iran’s armed forces, or coordinate them?Unchanged
    1. 2026-09-13: No material change
    2. 2026-09-20: No material change
    3. 2026-09-27: No material change
    4. 2026-10-04: No material change
    5. 2026-10-05: Observable met
    6. 2026-10-18: No material change
    7. 2026-10-25: No material change
    8. 2026-11-01: No material change
  • LogisticsIs the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?Movement
    1. 2026-09-13: Movement observed
    2. 2026-09-20: Assessment changed
    3. 2026-09-27: Assessment changed
    4. 2026-10-04: Assessment changed
    5. 2026-10-11: Assessment changed
    6. 2026-10-18: Movement observed
    7. 2026-10-25: Movement observed
    8. 2026-11-01: Movement observed
  • MilitaryWho attacked Ras Tanura?Unchanged
    1. 2026-09-04: Baseline
    2. 2026-09-13: No material change
    3. 2026-09-20: No material change
    4. 2026-09-27: No material change
    5. 2026-10-04: No material change
    6. 2026-10-18: No material change
    7. 2026-10-25: No material change
    8. 2026-11-01: No material change

Connected records

5 records that this organisation names, or that name it — every one an explicit reference in a published record, nothing inferred from subject matter.

Commanded or sponsored by1

Actor records that name this organisation.

Participates in1

Campaigns whose participant list names this organisation.

Analytical Notes1

Published Notes whose analysis names this record. The Note owns the edge; this is the way back to it.