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Force Atlas

伊斯蘭革命衛隊海軍

نیروی دریایی سپاه پاسداران انقلاب اسلامی

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy

IRAN · ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY GUARD CORPS · BRANCH

Part of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

伊朗 進行中
評估截至
2026-10-23
已檢視
2026-10-29
信心
中等
  • 國家隸屬 · 伊朗
  • Vigil類別圖示 · 非官方徽記
識別來源

國家隸屬:伊朗。

Vigil類別圖示——依此紀錄自身的領域、層級與角色繪製。並非官方徽記。

概要

革命衛隊的海上軍種,也是伊朗面向海灣的海軍——以小艇、飛彈與不對稱手段而非戰艦為主,是與荷莫茲海峽所受壓力關聯最密切的機構。

範圍
結構、角色、沿革與連結。已發布5筆下屬紀錄。
隸屬
隸屬:已證實
來源
紀錄所載:3
紀錄狀態
部分
廣泛活動地區
The Persian Gulf and the approaches to the Strait of Hormuz
重要歷史
Where the Artesh Navy is conventional and oriented outward, the Guard Navy is asymmetric and oriented on the Gulf itself. It is built around large numbers of small fast craft, shore-based anti-ship missiles, mining capability and boarding parties rather than around warships, and the division of emphasis between the two Iranian navies — the Guard inside the Gulf, the Artesh beyond it — is described consistently enough by analysts to be treated as an institutional pattern, though Iran has never published it as a boundary. It is the service whose name appears in reporting on tanker seizures, harassment of merchant traffic and the approaches to the strait, and it is the reason "the Iranian navy" is an ambiguous phrase in almost every account of a Gulf incident.
優勢
A force designed for the specific geography it operates in: a narrow, shallow, crowded sea in which mass, dispersion and short ranges matter more than tonnage. Its methods are cheap, distributed and hard to eliminate by striking a small number of targets — which is precisely what makes maritime pressure a durable Iranian option even after heavy losses elsewhere.
限制
Its capabilities are coercive rather than decisive: they can raise the cost and the risk of using the strait, and the commercial withdrawal of war-risk cover in March 2026 shows how effective that can be, but they have not sealed the water and the strait has never been physically closed. Attribution is also a persistent problem for anyone assessing it — Iran denied targeting Gulf energy facilities in the same period that the Guard publicly claimed a tanker strike. In October 2026 the Guard moved from unclaimed pressure to claimed action: on 9 October it claimed a tanker strike for an "unauthorised route" and said action would no longer be limited to the strait, and the Guard navy claimed seven tankers attacked or mined overnight into 22 October, a claim a Central Command spokesperson called incorrect. Claims are carried as claims and none is counted. This record contains no vessels, no positions, no patrol patterns, no mining areas and no description of how any of it is conducted.

相關組織

  • 伊朗正規軍海軍 在機構上關聯於 · 截至2026-09 · 中等信心

    The two Iranian navies are separate services under separate commands with a broadly separate division of labour — the Artesh Navy conventional and oriented outward past Hormuz, the Guard Navy asymmetric and oriented on the Gulf itself. The division is described consistently by analysts but has never been published as a formal boundary by Iran, and this module records it as an institutional pattern rather than a jurisdictional line.

相關地點

Strait of Hormuz: A statement about mission emphasis, not about presence. The Guard Navy's assigned area of emphasis is the Gulf and the approaches to the strait, which is what distinguishes it institutionally from the Artesh Navy. The strait's geography, traffic and access states are owned by this module's maritime records; nothing here adds a position, a patrol area or a pattern.

有日期的結構變化

戰役

將此組織列為參與方的戰役。該關係由戰役紀錄擁有並評定等級;此清單為計算所得。

  • 2026年國家間戰爭 Opposing force · Since 28 February 2026 · moderate confidence · as of 2026-09

    面向海灣的軍種,海峽封鎖與對航運的施壓都與其任務相關;未將任何具體作戰歸於它。

關鍵事件

2026年2月28日關聯部隊中等信心

伊朗宣布荷莫茲海峽對正常商業交通關閉

伊朗部隊宣布關閉海峽,穿越海峽的交通大致停止。在2025年的基準中,每日約有20百萬桶原油與石油產品經由此海峽運輸,另有近五分之一的全球液化天然氣出口。

2026年10月5日 – 10日據報參與方中等信心

革命衛隊以「未經授權航路」為由聲稱打擊一艘油輪,中央司令部則宣布航道開放

對油輪的打擊持續至10月的前十天:UKMTO報告,10月5日一艘油輪在海峽內受損並發生機艙火災;10月6日,懸掛巴拿馬國旗的On Peace號在Limah外海約九浬處遭打擊並起火,阿曼國防部將十名船員撤往Khasab,據印度的說法,十九名船員中至少十二人受傷。10月9日,革命衛隊聲稱已因「Sun Shine」號使用海峽南段的「未經授權航路」而使其起火,表示對「違規」船舶的行動將不再限於海峽之內,並表示與美國合作的公司將受到制裁,其船舶將成為目標。Kpler統計10月6日有七艘大宗商品船通過海峽,為7月23日以來最少。在革命衛隊提出聲稱的同一天,中央司令部表示已清除主要航道的水雷,並宣布航道對未違反美國對伊朗制裁的船舶開放;10月10日,它表示一架美國戰鬥機使一艘駛離伊朗港口的船舶失去動力,這是自7月14日對伊朗港口實施封鎖以來的第四艘。

評估截至 — 2026-10-23 最近檢視 — 2026-10-29

在結構中檢視此部隊 互動式:選取此紀錄並追蹤與其關聯的內容。

此部隊涉及的Watch問題

證據經由此部隊的常設分析問題,各附最新一次檢視。內容衍生自Watch物件,從不在此重述。

  • 軍事是一個總部指揮伊朗的兩支武裝力量,還是協調它們?未變
    1. 2026-09-13:無實質變化
    2. 2026-09-20:無實質變化
    3. 2026-09-27:無實質變化
    4. 2026-10-04:無實質變化
    5. 2026-10-05:觀察指標已達成
    6. 2026-10-18:無實質變化
    7. 2026-10-25:無實質變化
    8. 2026-11-01:無實質變化
  • 後勤荷莫茲海峽是否已恢復商業可用?變動
    1. 2026-09-13:觀察到變動
    2. 2026-09-20:評估已變更
    3. 2026-09-27:評估已變更
    4. 2026-10-04:評估已變更
    5. 2026-10-11:評估已變更
    6. 2026-10-18:觀察到變動
    7. 2026-10-25:觀察到變動
    8. 2026-11-01:觀察到變動
  • 軍事誰攻擊了Ras Tanura?未變
    1. 2026-09-04:基準
    2. 2026-09-13:無實質變化
    3. 2026-09-20:無實質變化
    4. 2026-09-27:無實質變化
    5. 2026-10-04:無實質變化
    6. 2026-10-18:無實質變化
    7. 2026-10-25:無實質變化
    8. 2026-11-01:無實質變化

相關紀錄

此組織所提及、或提及此組織的紀錄共5筆——每一筆都是已發布紀錄中的明確引用,沒有任何一筆是依主題推斷而來。

指揮或資助方1

提及此組織的行為者紀錄。

參與1

參與方名單中列有此組織的戰役。

分析札記1

分析中提及此紀錄的已發布札記。該連結由札記所擁有;這裡是返回它的途徑。