The condition still said no text was public, untrue since 20–21 October. Türkiye's Foreign Affairs Commission approved the approval bill on 27 October, and its deputy foreign minister said Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had completed ratification; the bill was not on the General Assembly agenda of 28 October. On 26 October the three signatories sent a joint delegation to Tehran. Not met: implementing-instrument; no invocation or named contribution.
Brief itemTürkiye's commission approved the Makkah Agreement, and its three signatories went to Tehran together
Movement in reach, unconfirmed: the Houthi movement claimed Ras Tanura on 27 and 29 October, and Bloomberg, citing an unnamed person, reported a fire near the terminal contained on 27 October; no Saudi or Aramco statement was found. No operator restart or repair statement on the east–west pipeline or Ras Laffan for an eighth review.
Movement in the channel, no text. A letter from the US Vice President, delivered through Qatar to the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, proposed talks with the nuclear programme on the table from the outset, as reported; the secretary said the tone had changed. Qatari mediators returned to Tehran on 30 October. No framework, schedule or written arrangement; OFAC's 29 October general licence amends no instrument.
Brief itemA US letter proposed talks with Iran, and nothing between them is agreed
A commitment with institutions, a published text and no demonstrated procedure.
Latest reviewChanged
The condition still said no text was public, untrue since 20–21 October. Türkiye's Foreign Affairs Commission approved the approval bill on 27 October, and its deputy foreign minister said Saudi Arabia and Pakistan had completed ratification; the bill was not on the General Assembly agenda of 28 October. On 26 October the three signatories sent a joint delegation to Tehran. Not met: implementing-instrument; no invocation or named contribution.
Reached repeatedly, restored unevenly, and the alternatives reached too.
Latest reviewMovement
Movement in reach, unconfirmed: the Houthi movement claimed Ras Tanura on 27 and 29 October, and Bloomberg, citing an unnamed person, reported a fire near the terminal contained on 27 October; no Saudi or Aramco statement was found. No operator restart or repair statement on the east–west pipeline or Ras Laffan for an eighth review.
Movement in the channel, no text. A letter from the US Vice President, delivered through Qatar to the secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, proposed talks with the nuclear programme on the table from the outset, as reported; the secretary said the tone had changed. Qatari mediators returned to Tehran on 30 October. No framework, schedule or written arrangement; OFAC's 29 October general licence amends no instrument.
A Saudi-backed offensive, under way. On 4 October 2026 Yemen's Presidential Leadership Council announced operations to retake all Houthi-held territory, and the coalition stated an air campaign with air cover for the Bab el-Mandeb strait. Government forces claim Dhubab and Mokha and the movement denies losing ground; on 10 October government sources said the waterway was not secured. Attacks on Riyadh's airport killed three on 8 October and twelve on 10 October, by Saudi account; the United States blames the movement. No truce instrument is in force; no mediated round is announced.
Latest reviewMovement
The Houthi movement claimed Ras Tanura on 27 and 29 October, with Rabigh, Abqaiq and the Riyadh and Dammam airports; Riyadh confirmed none. The coalition reported interceptions towards Riyadh on 29 and 31 October. Egypt's parliament authorised support at the kingdom's request on 26 October. Saudi strikes in Yemen are reported by Houthi media only. No channel act, truce, external strike or Makkah invocation.
Closed by judgment, not water: the strait remained physically passable.
Latest reviewMovement
Tankers were struck in the strait on 28, 29 and 30 October (UKMTO 186-, 187- and 189-26; Oman's account of the RITI), one by explosives a small boat fixed to its hull. The Revolutionary Guard claimed four tankers halted or mined; Central Command said the main routes were cleared. UKMTO counted 277 combined transits in the week to 28 October, about 70% below pre-conflict. No cover written, no régime, IMO unchanged.
No Council or Command decision, shared early-warning act or common rules found. The coalition reported Saudi interceptions on 29 and 31 October, naming no integrated structure. The authorisation vote was not checked.
Command converges at the top on the record: the Supreme Leader appoints both forces’ commanders, and the clearest restraint order of the war, on 8 April 2026, went to all branches in his name.
Latest reviewUnchanged
No material change. The Supreme Leader's order of 31 October, issued after he met the chief of staff of the armed forces and the army and Revolutionary Guard commanders, addressed the armed forces as a whole; no merged structure or stated authority was published.
Reviewed on the UN record, not the Agency's own pages, which returned a bot challenge. The Director General told the Security Council on 27 October that Iran has not provided the information and access needed to verify previously declared nuclear material (SC/16491). No inspection, resumed-verification statement or accountancy; a Qatari proposal reported to cover inspections is a proposal.
A declared blockade, a changed shore, no established closure.
Latest reviewUnchanged
No material change. UKMTO's overview of 30 October reports no attack on shipping in the Red Sea or Bab el-Mandeb since 24 August, and transits 24% below their level before the 22 July blockade announcement. Suspected pirate approaches in the Gulf of Aden on 28 and 30 October are not shown to be conflict-linked. Found late: Belgium confirmed that a French frigate downed a missile approaching its minehunter Primula near the strait in mid-October; unclaimed, and not an attack on commerce.
A confirmed physical event with a disputed attribution.
Latest reviewUnchanged
No investigation report, forensic evidence or change of position on the March strike. The Houthi claims of 27 and 29 October concern new attacks and do not bear on its attribution.
Each Board cycle without an inspection lengthens the period the Agency cannot account for, and the accountancy gap grows with the calendar whether or not anything else moves.
No quiet question matches the current filter.
Local record tests2 further entries on the module’s standing watch list that stayed with the conflict record — record-specific tests rather than canonical questions.
2 local entriesrecord-specific tests on the module’s standing watch list
Watch the three legal systems separately, because they are separate: the United Nations measures that returned under the snapback, the European Union restrictive measures reimposed by Council decision on 29 September 2025, and United States measures including General License U of 20 March 2026 authorising certain Iranian petroleum transactions. The baseline is that all three are in force and were not adopted together. The change that would count is an amending instrument in one of them — and a change in one system is not a change in the others, which is why a sanctions headline is never a status for the file as a whole.
Watch for a change in the stated mandate of the Combined Maritime Forces or in its 47-nation membership. The baseline is a partnership whose stated mission is against illicit non-state actors, headquartered in Bahrain, commanded by the same officer who commands the United States Fifth Fleet and NAVCENT — and which is not a party to the interstate war on that account. The change that would count is a formal mandate change or a member's declared withdrawal. The shared commander is an institutional fact and not evidence of a merged mission, and this module does not treat coalition activity as belligerent activity.
