Foundations
How the system acquired its shape
Three things fixed in seventeen years and none has moved since.
PhasesHigh confidence
Foundations
Three things fixed in seventeen years and none has moved since.
The security architecture
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the campaign that reversed it left a durable American military presence hosted under bilateral arrangements with several Gulf states, and those arrangements — not any Gulf institution — are what the region's security has rested on since.
The immediate approach
Iran and Saudi Arabia normalised relations in Beijing in 2023, which is the last significant de-escalation the system has recorded.
The current war
United States and Israeli strikes opened on 28 February and Israel killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei the same day.
Three things fixed in seventeen years and none has moved since. Britain withdrew from east of Suez in 1971 and Iran occupied three islands at the strait's mouth on the eve of the UAE's federation, creating a territorial dispute that is still live. The 1979 revolution replaced one Iranian state with another and built a second army beside the first. And the Iran–Iraq war produced the Tanker War, in which attacks on commercial shipping, the reflagging of tankers and outside navies in the Gulf were all tried for the first time.
The mechanism the current war runs on is not new. Attacking commerce to coerce a state, and pricing rather than force deciding who sails, were both demonstrated in the 1980s — which is why the Council reached back forty-two years to cite itself.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the campaign that reversed it left a durable American military presence hosted under bilateral arrangements with several Gulf states, and those arrangements — not any Gulf institution — are what the region's security has rested on since. The nuclear file opened and closed in the same period: the 2015 agreement, the American withdrawal from it in 2018, and the 2019 Abqaiq attack that showed how much could be taken offline in a morning.
Gulf security was built as a set of bilateral relationships with an outside power rather than as a collective institution, and the current war is the first test of what that means when the outside power is itself a belligerent.
Iran and Saudi Arabia normalised relations in Beijing in 2023, which is the last significant de-escalation the system has recorded. Then in June 2025 Israel and the United States fought a twelve-day war with Iran that ended in an announced ceasefire — and after which the inspectors did not go back. The snapback mechanism was triggered that August and United Nations measures returned in late September. Eight months passed before the current war opened, and the interval matters: it is why June 2025 is a separate conflict rather than the first phase of this one.
The twelve-day war ended and the verification did not resume. Everything the module cannot say about Iran's nuclear programme dates from this period, not from the current war.
United States and Israeli strikes opened on 28 February and Israel killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei the same day. Iran declared the strait closed, and a week later the withdrawal of marine war-risk cover closed it commercially. Iran struck all six Gulf Arab states; the Security Council condemned the attacks in resolution 2817 and split on shipping in April. A memorandum signed in June was declared over in July and expired in August, and the heaviest exchange in more than a month followed on 1–2 September.
The strait was never sealed and never physically closed. What closed it was the price of insuring a voyage through it — which is the module's central finding and the subject of its flagship analytical note.