What this system is
Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and products moved through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline, roughly a third of global crude trade; every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea with one outlet. Every bypass combined is a 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d ceiling, and gas has no bypass at all.
The physical basis of the module's central finding: that the Gulf's exposure is a matter of outlets and liquefaction, not of oil in the ground, and that the bypass argument which applies to crude in part applies to gas not at all.
Confidence: High As of 2026-10-21Reviewed 2026-10-29
The system
- Overview
- The system runs from the fields — the shared North Dome / South Pars gas field, Saudi and Emirati crude — through processing at Abqaiq and Habshan, liquefaction at Ras Laffan, and the terminals at Ras Tanura, Kharg, Mina al-Ahmadi, Sitra and Mina al-Fahal, every one of which loads into the Gulf. The partial alternatives are the Saudi East–West (Petroline) system to Yanbu, with a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019 that was never a demonstrated sustained rate, and the UAE's ADCOP line to Fujairah at just under 2 million b/d; Iraq's line to Türkiye reopened in September 2025 at a fraction of pre-war exports; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have no bypass. Gas is different in kind: Qatar exported close to a fifth of global LNG through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline and has no pipeline and no terminal that avoids the strait, so the constraint is liquefaction rather than the route.
- Current state · as of 2026-10-21
- Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen trains were damaged on 18 March 2026 — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure — with the operator's own repair estimate at up to five years; Qatar's 2026 exports are forecast at roughly half the pre-conflict level. Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity on 10–11 March 2026, and an Iranian drone strike in April temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated handling. In September 2026 Gulf crude exports excluding Iran regained the pre-war level by route rather than by reopening: about 60 per cent crossed the strait on shuttle tankers and the rest left from Fujairah and the Red Sea (Kpler). The East–West line, restarted after the 10 September attack, is estimated at 2 to 2.65 million b/d by trackers, with no operator figure in any review to 25 October. In October the fixed nodes were reached but not put out: a limited fire at Aramco's Dhahran headquarters on 13 October, an intercepted missile aimed at Yanbu on 16 October, and on 21 October drone debris outside the Shaybah field that killed two workers without affecting operations.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the IEA, the EIA and the operators publish: the capacity and ceiling figures above, the share of Qatari export capacity damaged, and the commercial estimate of Yanbu handling. No facility-level state is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- Crude oil and refined products · Liquefied natural gas · Refined product imports and power fuel
Nodes
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- FujairahPort
The UAE's outlet beyond the strait, fed by the ADCOP line at just under 2 million b/d of capacity.
- Kharg IslandPort
Iran's principal crude outlet, inside the enclosed sea like every other.
- Ras LaffanPort
The liquefaction and export complex with no substitute; two of fourteen trains damaged in March 2026.
- Ras TanuraPort
Saudi Arabia's principal Gulf terminal, loading into the enclosed sea.
- SoharPort
- YanbuPort
The Red Sea end of the East–West system — the largest partial bypass, and a ceiling rather than a flow.
- AbqaiqIndustrial centre
- Abu Dhabi crude pipeline corridorCorridor · supply & trade artery
- East–West pipeline corridor (Petroline)Corridor · supply & trade artery
- Goreh–Jask pipeline corridorCorridor · supply & trade artery
- HabshanIndustrial centre
- JaskPort
- JazanRefinery
- Mina al-AhmadiPort
- Mina al-FahalPort
- North Dome / South Pars gas fieldMining area · broad region
- DuqmPort
- MesaieedPort
Qatar's industrial port and power-and-desalination complex, the Qatari energy node the war touched other than Ras Laffan (water tank struck 2 March 2026, as the marker records). Added 2026-10-29.
- RuwaisRefinery
- SalalahPort
- ShuaibaPort
Kuwait's refining and utility coast beside Mina al-Ahmadi, where power and drinking water come from the same plants; the marker carries no strike. Added 2026-10-29.
- SitraPort
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- Hormuz-dependent crude and products export systemMineral export · 8 nodes · 6 documented disruptions · named by the recordThe system through which six of the seven core Gulf states send their oil to market, converging on one strait.
- Qatari LNG export systemGas & LNG · 3 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordThe cleanest dependency in the module: close to a fifth of world LNG, one complex, one strait, and no alternative of any size.
- Saudi east–west crude transitMineral export · 4 nodes · 8 documented disruptions · named by the recordThe largest Hormuz alternative in existence, limited by its terminal rather than by its pipeline, and opening onto a second contested strait.
- UAE alternative export accessMineral export · 3 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordThe only major bypass reaching the open ocean directly — smaller than commonly assumed, and itself reachable.
- Iranian crude export systemMineral export · 4 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordA single terminal inside the strait, and a bypass that was built and has barely been used.
Organisations that run it
- Saudi AramcoState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the East–West pipeline system to Yanbu — the largest of the partial alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, and a capacity figure rather than a demonstrated sustained rate.
- QatarEnergyState enterprise · ActiveThe state operator of Ras Laffan and of close to a fifth of global LNG supply, every tonne of which leaves through the Strait of Hormuz because no pipeline or alternative terminal exists.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
The Strait of Hormuz. Every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea whose only outlet is the strait; every alternative combined is estimated at 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d against a normal strait volume of about 20 million — a capacity comparison, not a measurement of what moved.
Liquefaction capacity at Ras Laffan. LNG has no pipeline substitute and no alternative terminal; capacity destroyed is capacity destroyed, and no rerouting shortens it.
The East–West pipeline and Yanbu. The largest partial bypass, carrying a 2019 emergency ceiling never demonstrated as a sustained rate; wartime handling at Yanbu is a commercial estimate, of which roughly two thirds feeds Aramco's own Red Sea refineries before export crude can load.
Marine war-risk cover. The mechanism that stopped the traffic: cover, not capacity, decides whether a loaded tanker sails. Documented on the commercial-closure chain.
A second ADCOP line targeting 3.6 million b/d by mid-2027 is a plan, not an asset.
The repair timeline at Ras Laffan is the operator's own estimate; no independent assessment of it was read.
The East–West line was reported restarted at a low rate on unnamed sources, and Yanbu loadings were reported resumed between 25 and 28 September; no operator or ministry statement of the restart, its rate or the damage has been published.
The East–West pipeline was struck by drones the foreign ministry said came from Iraq and shut by the Ministry of Energy as a precaution; Saudi crude was then routed through the strait itself on escorted short legs until the restart.
An Iranian drone strike temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated wartime handling.
Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure, roughly 12.8 Mtpa — with repairs estimated by the operator at up to five years.
Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity, against a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019.
Transmission chains through this system
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- Hormuz disruption and the limits of the bypassEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09-30
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Plausible exposure
- significance Plausible exposure
- Qatari LNG and the absence of an alternativeEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09-30
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Confirmed
- significance Plausible exposure
- The bypass outlet and the second chokepointEconomic exposure · as of 2026-10-10
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Plausible exposure
- significance Plausible exposure
- Commercial withdrawal closed the straitEconomic exposure · as of 2026-10-21
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Confirmed
- significance Confirmed
- Where power and water are the same systemCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Plausible exposure
- significance Plausible exposure
- Crews aboard vessels that could not moveCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Confirmed
- disruption Confirmed
- exposure Confirmed
- significance Confirmed
Watch questions bearing on it
- Is the Strait of Hormuz commercially usable again?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Are the Gulf's fixed energy nodes being restored faster than they are re-struck?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Does Gulf air and missile defence become institutionally integrated?active · No material change 2026-11-01
- Does the Makkah Agreement become an operational defence mechanism?active · Assessment changed 2026-11-01
- Does the Saudi–Houthi front settle into a negotiated arrangement, or escalate into a Saudi campaign in Yemen?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Is Bab el-Mandeb still usable, and for whom?active · No material change 2026-11-01
- Who attacked Ras Tanura?active · No material change 2026-11-01
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
Analytical Notes
Actors and arrangements
What remains unknown
- No sustained wartime throughput for the East–West system has been published; the record carries ceilings and a commercial estimate.
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Assessed as of — 2026-10-21 Last reviewed — 2026-10-29