Що це за система
Around 20 million barrels a day of crude and products moved through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline, roughly a third of global crude trade; every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea with one outlet. Every bypass combined is a 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d ceiling, and gas has no bypass at all.
The physical basis of the module's central finding: that the Gulf's exposure is a matter of outlets and liquefaction, not of oil in the ground, and that the bypass argument which applies to crude in part applies to gas not at all.
Впевненість: висока Станом на 2026-10-21Переглянуто 2026-10-29
Система
- Огляд
- The system runs from the fields — the shared North Dome / South Pars gas field, Saudi and Emirati crude — through processing at Abqaiq and Habshan, liquefaction at Ras Laffan, and the terminals at Ras Tanura, Kharg, Mina al-Ahmadi, Sitra and Mina al-Fahal, every one of which loads into the Gulf. The partial alternatives are the Saudi East–West (Petroline) system to Yanbu, with a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019 that was never a demonstrated sustained rate, and the UAE's ADCOP line to Fujairah at just under 2 million b/d; Iraq's line to Türkiye reopened in September 2025 at a fraction of pre-war exports; Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Oman have no bypass. Gas is different in kind: Qatar exported close to a fifth of global LNG through Hormuz in the 2025 baseline and has no pipeline and no terminal that avoids the strait, so the constraint is liquefaction rather than the route.
- Current state · as of 2026-10-21
- Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen trains were damaged on 18 March 2026 — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure — with the operator's own repair estimate at up to five years; Qatar's 2026 exports are forecast at roughly half the pre-conflict level. Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity on 10–11 March 2026, and an Iranian drone strike in April temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated handling. In September 2026 Gulf crude exports excluding Iran regained the pre-war level by route rather than by reopening: about 60 per cent crossed the strait on shuttle tankers and the rest left from Fujairah and the Red Sea (Kpler). The East–West line, restarted after the 10 September attack, is estimated at 2 to 2.65 million b/d by trackers, with no operator figure in any review to 25 October. In October the fixed nodes were reached but not put out: a limited fire at Aramco's Dhahran headquarters on 13 October, an intercepted missile aimed at Yanbu on 16 October, and on 21 October drone debris outside the Shaybah field that killed two workers without affecting operations.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the IEA, the EIA and the operators publish: the capacity and ceiling figures above, the share of Qatari export capacity damaged, and the commercial estimate of Yanbu handling. No facility-level state is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- Crude oil and refined products · Liquefied natural gas · Refined product imports and power fuel
Вузли
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- ФуджейраПорт
The UAE's outlet beyond the strait, fed by the ADCOP line at just under 2 million b/d of capacity.
- Острів ХаркПорт
Iran's principal crude outlet, inside the enclosed sea like every other.
- Рас-ЛаффанПорт
The liquefaction and export complex with no substitute; two of fourteen trains damaged in March 2026.
- Рас-ТанураПорт
Saudi Arabia's principal Gulf terminal, loading into the enclosed sea.
- СохарПорт
- ЯнбуПорт
The Red Sea end of the East–West system — the largest partial bypass, and a ceiling rather than a flow.
- АбкайкПромисловий центр
- Коридор нафтопроводу Абу-ДабіКоридор · артерія постачання й торгівлі
- Коридор трубопроводу Схід–Захід (Petroline)Коридор · артерія постачання й торгівлі
- Коридор трубопроводу Горе–ДжаскКоридор · артерія постачання й торгівлі
- ХабшанПромисловий центр
- ДжаскПорт
- ДжизанНафтопереробний завод
- Міна-ель-АхмадіПорт
- Міна-ель-ФахальПорт
- Газове родовище Норт-Доум / Південний ПарсРайон видобутку · широкий регіон
- ДукмПорт
- MesaieedПорт
Qatar's industrial port and power-and-desalination complex, the Qatari energy node the war touched other than Ras Laffan (water tank struck 2 March 2026, as the marker records). Added 2026-10-29.
- РувайсНафтопереробний завод
- СалалаПорт
- ShuaibaПорт
Kuwait's refining and utility coast beside Mina al-Ahmadi, where power and drinking water come from the same plants; the marker carries no strike. Added 2026-10-29.
- СітраПорт
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- Залежна від Ормузу система експорту нафти й нафтопродуктівMineral export · 8 nodes · 6 documented disruptions · named by the recordСистема, через яку шість із семи ключових держав Затоки відправляють свою нафту на ринок, сходячись до однієї протоки.
- Катарська система експорту СПГGas & LNG · 3 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordНайчистіша залежність у модулі: майже п’ята частина світового СПГ, один комплекс, одна протока і жодної альтернативи значного розміру.
- Саудівський транзит нафти Схід–ЗахідMineral export · 4 nodes · 8 documented disruptions · named by the recordНайбільша наявна альтернатива Ормузу, обмежена своїм терміналом, а не трубопроводом, і з виходом до другої спірної протоки.
- Альтернативний експортний доступ ОАЕMineral export · 3 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordЄдиний великий обхідний шлях, що безпосередньо виходить у відкритий океан, — менший, ніж зазвичай вважають, і сам досяжний.
- Іранська система експорту сирої нафтиMineral export · 4 nodes · 4 documented disruptions · named by the recordОдин термінал усередині протоки та обхідний шлях, який збудували і майже не використовували.
Organisations that run it
- Saudi AramcoState enterprise · ActiveThe state oil company that operates the East–West pipeline system to Yanbu — the largest of the partial alternatives to the Strait of Hormuz, and a capacity figure rather than a demonstrated sustained rate.
- QatarEnergyState enterprise · ActiveThe state operator of Ras Laffan and of close to a fifth of global LNG supply, every tonne of which leaves through the Strait of Hormuz because no pipeline or alternative terminal exists.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
The Strait of Hormuz. Every core state except Oman loads into an enclosed sea whose only outlet is the strait; every alternative combined is estimated at 3.5 to 5.5 million b/d against a normal strait volume of about 20 million — a capacity comparison, not a measurement of what moved.
Liquefaction capacity at Ras Laffan. LNG has no pipeline substitute and no alternative terminal; capacity destroyed is capacity destroyed, and no rerouting shortens it.
The East–West pipeline and Yanbu. The largest partial bypass, carrying a 2019 emergency ceiling never demonstrated as a sustained rate; wartime handling at Yanbu is a commercial estimate, of which roughly two thirds feeds Aramco's own Red Sea refineries before export crude can load.
Marine war-risk cover. The mechanism that stopped the traffic: cover, not capacity, decides whether a loaded tanker sails. Documented on the commercial-closure chain.
A second ADCOP line targeting 3.6 million b/d by mid-2027 is a plan, not an asset.
The repair timeline at Ras Laffan is the operator's own estimate; no independent assessment of it was read.
The East–West line was reported restarted at a low rate on unnamed sources, and Yanbu loadings were reported resumed between 25 and 28 September; no operator or ministry statement of the restart, its rate or the damage has been published.
The East–West pipeline was struck by drones the foreign ministry said came from Iraq and shut by the Ministry of Energy as a precaution; Saudi crude was then routed through the strait itself on escorted short legs until the restart.
An Iranian drone strike temporarily disabled about 700,000 b/d of Yanbu's commercially estimated wartime handling.
Two of Ras Laffan's fourteen liquefaction trains were damaged — about 17 per cent of Qatari export capacity on the EIA's figure, roughly 12.8 Mtpa — with repairs estimated by the operator at up to five years.
Aramco announced a ramp of the East–West system to full capacity, against a roughly 7 million b/d emergency ceiling established in 2019.
Ланцюги передачі через цю систему
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- Порушення в Ормузькій протоці та межі обхідного маршрутуEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09-30
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Правдоподібна вразливість
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
- Катарський СПГ і відсутність альтернативиEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09-30
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Підтверджено
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
- Обхідний вихід і друге вузьке місцеEconomic exposure · as of 2026-10-10
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Правдоподібна вразливість
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
- Комерційний відхід закрив протокуEconomic exposure · as of 2026-10-21
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Підтверджено
- significance Підтверджено
- Де електроенергія і вода — одна системаCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Правдоподібна вразливість
- significance Правдоподібна вразливість
- Екіпажі на борту суден, які не могли рушитиCivilian impact · as of 2026-09
- asset Підтверджено
- disruption Підтверджено
- exposure Підтверджено
- significance Підтверджено
Watch questions bearing on it
- Чи знову придатна Ормузька протока для комерційного використання?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Чи відновлюються фіксовані енергетичні вузли Затоки швидше, ніж по них завдають повторних ударів?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Чи стане протиповітряна та протиракетна оборона Затоки інституційно інтегрованою?active · No material change 2026-11-01
- Чи стане Меккська угода діючим оборонним механізмом?active · Assessment changed 2026-11-01
- Чи перейде саудівсько-хуситський фронт у договірну домовленість, чи ескалює в саудівську кампанію в Ємені?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Чи придатна ще Баб-ель-Мандебська протока для використання, і для кого?active · No material change 2026-11-01
- Хто атакував Рас-Тануру?active · No material change 2026-11-01
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
Аналітичні записки
Actors and arrangements
Що залишається невідомим
- No sustained wartime throughput for the East–West system has been published; the record carries ceilings and a commercial estimate.
Відкрити в режимі «Досліджувати» Інтерактивно: виберіть цей запис і простежте, що з ним пов’язано.
Оцінено станом на — 2026-10-21 Востаннє переглянуто — 2026-10-29