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Conflict coverage · South Caucasus

Caucasus

Strategic logistics

The systems a war and an economy actually run on — import corridors, ports, crossings and hubs — and what depends on each one, how completely, and what has documentably disrupted it.

South Caucasus / North CaucasusRegional systemPublished

Published
Newest record assessed
2026-08
Conflict reviewed
2026-09-06

Weekly review / event-driven updates

Context, not targeting. These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout.

Supply systems4 systems Caucasus runs on, with 14 documented disruptions between them. Dependence is the strategic fact — a corridor matters because there is no substitute for it.

General trade

The Middle Corridor — east–west trade transit

The overland route between China and Europe that avoids both Russia and Iran, and which works in the places where it has actually been built.

8 nodes3 documented disruptionsAs of 2026-08

What the nodes are notQualifiers the records themselves carry. A node named on a corridor is not necessarily a working one — several are proposed, closed, seasonal or legacy, and each says so in the record's own words.

Caspian energy export — the westward pipeline system

  • Baku — The Caspian production and export origin. Recorded as the module's published capital marker, not as a facility.
  • Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan energy corridor — The module's published corridor marker for the westward pipeline route as a whole.
  • Tbilisi — Georgia is the transit state; the capital stands for the country's role rather than for any point on the route.
  • Batumi — Black Sea outlet, and part of the wider export picture alongside the pipeline route.
  • Armenia–Türkiye border — Included as the published marker for the closed border — the reason no route runs through Armenia and the clearest single expression of its exclusion.

Armenian external access — two borders open, two closed

  • Upper Lars crossing — The only functioning crossing between Georgia and Russia, and therefore the bottleneck of Armenia's northern trade. Closes for weather and has closed for politics.
  • Tbilisi — Georgia is the transit state for the large majority of Armenian trade.
  • Poti — Black Sea outlet used for Armenian containerised trade.
  • Gyumri — Near the closed Turkish border; the rail line through it has been out of service since 1993.
  • Armenia–Türkiye border — CLOSED since 1993. Recorded as the system's principal constraint rather than as a route.
  • Syunik province — The southern province carrying the Iranian route, and the territory any proposed Azerbaijani connection to Nakhchivan would cross.
  • Lachin corridor (legacy) — HISTORICAL. Operated between 2020 and 2023 connecting Armenia to Karabakh under the trilateral arrangement; blockaded from December 2022 and superseded by the September 2023 events. It does not exist as a system now and is recorded for completeness, not as current capacity.

The Middle Corridor — east–west trade transit

  • Baku — Caspian crossing point on the western shore, and the corridor's principal transhipment stage.
  • Middle Corridor (Trans-Caspian route) — The module's published marker for the route as a whole.
  • Tbilisi — Georgian rail transit; the capital stands for the country's segment.
  • Poti — Georgia's principal Black Sea container port and the corridor's maritime outlet where cargo does not continue by rail into Türkiye.
  • Armenia–Türkiye border — Closed. Recorded as a constraint on the system rather than as part of it — its opening would add a route that does not currently exist.
  • Nakhchivan — PROPOSED, not operating. A land connection between Azerbaijan and its exclave across southern Armenia is a subject of negotiation; no such route is in service and this record does not treat it as infrastructure.
  • Syunik province — PROPOSED, not operating. The Armenian territory any such connection would cross, and the reason the question is a sovereignty matter rather than an engineering one.

TRIPP — the proposed Syunik transit route

  • Nakhchivan — PROPOSED TERMINUS. The Azerbaijani exclave the route is intended to reach. Azerbaijan has reported a 194 km railway advancing toward the Armenian border on its own side and describes Nakhchivan as a prospective cargo hub. Existing infrastructure on Azerbaijani territory; not TRIPP.
  • Syunik province — PROPOSED CROSSING. The Armenian province the route would cross. Nothing has been built here. Syunik also carries Armenia's existing north–south road to Iran, which is a separate system and is not part of TRIPP.
  • Baku — Origin of the Azerbaijani rail and road network the route would join. Existing infrastructure.
  • Yerevan — Armenia's administrative centre and the seat of the jurisdiction question: Armenia's stated condition is that any route operate under Armenian law.
  • Armenia–Türkiye border — CLOSED. The onward connection that would give the route its wider value, linking Nakhchivan to Türkiye. Closed since 1993 and not opened; a completed TRIPP would terminate at a frontier that does not function.

Evidence and grading

Scope
These records describe strategic dependence and documented disruption history. The schema has no fields for capacities, schedules, convoy composition, escort arrangements, storage or facility layout, and the alternatives section describes whether redundancy exists — never which route to use.
Confidence
How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how severe the situation is.

Newest record assessed 2026-08Conflict reviewed 2026-09-06Methodology