The actor as a whole — political system, leadership, military capacity, alliances, strengths and vulnerabilities. The Force Atlas covers the units and equipment inside each one.
South Caucasus / North CaucasusRegional systemPublished
Published
Newest profile reviewed
2026-09-01
Conflict reviewed
2026-09-06
Weekly review / event-driven updates
Figures carry their own uncertainty. Population, economic and military-spending data in wartime are estimates, often contested; every figure on an actor record shows its own as-of date and confidence grade.
The actors13 actors, in the module's own order. Each opens a full profile: political system, leadership, forces, economy, stated and assessed objectives, constraints and red lines — every figure with its own as-of date, sources and confidence grade.Interrogate these actors in Explore →
A small state carrying the region's heaviest losses — the 2020 defeat, the 2023 fall of Karabakh, and the absorption of its displaced population — now betting its future on a peace it has initialled but not signed, and on a westward turn its geography makes expensive.
The region's military and energy ascendant: victor of 2020, holder of all of Karabakh since 2023, supplier Europe courts, Türkiye's closest partner — and a state that paces the peace process through preconditions because time, for now, works in its favour.
The region's transit state and its sharpest political contest: a country whose EU membership is written into its constitution and polled around 85% support, governed by a party that froze accession — with a fifth of its recognised territory under de facto separatist administration and Russian protection.
De facto authorities administering Abkhazia since the 1992–93 war — recognised by Russia and a handful of states since 2008, internationally recognised as part of Georgia, dependent on Russian money and security, and visibly resistant to full absorption.
The smaller of Georgia's two breakaway entities — de facto authorities in Tskhinvali, Russian-recognised since 2008, and by 2026 fused with Russia to a degree that makes "annexation in all but name" a mainstream description rather than a polemic.
The former metropole and ceasefire-broker of every Caucasus conflict — now a power stretched by Ukraine, whose Karabakh peacekeepers left early, whose Armenian ally froze their alliance, and whose remaining strength runs through garrisons, treaties of absorption, energy, trade and the North Caucasus interior.
Baku's military and political backer — decisive in 2020, formalised by the 2021 Shusha Declaration — and the terminus of every westbound corridor: for Ankara the Caucasus is the land bridge of its Turkic-world policy and a theatre where it has displaced Russian primacy without firing a shot.
The neighbour that treats the map itself as a red line: Iran borders both Armenia and Azerbaijan, trades with both, and opposes any corridor arrangement that would cut its land link to Armenia or put outside powers' personnel on its frontier.
The region's civilian power: monitor of Georgia's boundary lines since 2008, observer mission on Armenia's border since 2023, sometime mediator between Yerevan and Baku, gas customer of Azerbaijan — and the frozen destination of Georgia's constitutional European choice.
An episodic but sometimes decisive presence: host and broker of the August 2025 Washington summit, prospective majority partner in the TRIPP corridor venture, sanctions power over Russia's regional networks — with a Georgia relationship complicated by Tbilisi's crisis.
The unrecognised Armenian-run entity that administered mountainous Karabakh from the first war until 2023 — blockaded, defeated in a one-day offensive, emptied by the exodus of its population, and formally dissolved on 1 January 2024. Profiled here as history the region's present is built on.
The personalised order that ended the Chechen wars: Ramzan Kadyrov's rule over Chechnya in exchange for absolute loyalty to Vladimir Putin, federal subsidy, and a free hand internally — a system whose founder's failing health has made succession the North Caucasus's defining question.
The Russian-led collective security organisation whose only Caucasus member has frozen its participation, stopped paying, and said publicly it would be glad to be expelled — leaving the alliance holding a membership it can neither enforce nor end without conceding the point.
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Evidence and grading
Alignment
A grouping the module authored, with its own stated meaning. It is not a Vigil verdict about who is on whose side, and no two modules use the same alignment vocabulary.
Confidence
How well established Vigil considers this assessment to be. It is not a measure of how severe the situation is.