Stated · Vigil assessment
Objectives
What the 6 actors with a published posture in this module are trying to achieve — stated positions and Vigil’s assessments, kept apart.
Regional system
CorridorEnergyDe facto stateDisplacementRegional power
Parties6 groups, and what each one means
- ArmeniaThe Republic of Armenia and its institutions — a state repositioning itself between a failed Russian security guarantee and an unfinished peace with Azerbaijan.
- Azerbaijan & partnersThe Republic of Azerbaijan and its close Turkish partnership — the region's military and energy ascendant since 2020.
- GeorgiaThe Georgian state — a transit country between two breakaway regions and a contested political direction between Europe and accommodation with Moscow.
- De facto entitiesAuthorities that administer territory without international recognition — Abkhazia and South Ossetia today, the former Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian authorities historically. Listing is description, not recognition.
- Russia & aligned structuresThe Russian state, its regional military presence, and the North Caucasus power structures — including the Chechen system — that answer to Moscow on their own terms.
- External powers & mediatorsTürkiye, Iran, the EU and its Georgia monitoring mission, and the United States — outside actors whose corridors, guarantees and mediation shape the system without owning it.
Current state
Where this conflict stands
Graded per item · As of 2026-07
Armenia–Azerbaijan, Georgia's breakaway regions, Chechnya, and the corridors reshaping Russia's southern frontier. The Caucasus is not one war: it is a linked regional security system in which unresolved conflicts, de facto states, Soviet-drawn borders, displacement, energy routes and the competing interests of Russia, Türkiye, Iran and the West all act on each other — and in which Russia's absorption in Ukraine has set the whole system moving at once.
Feb 1988
Karabakh conflict re-ignites
100,000+
Karabakh Armenians displaced to Armenia (2023)
~290,000
Registered IDPs in Georgia (est.)
1.2M b/d
BTC pipeline design capacity
Changed in brief2026-09-06 · Status wording updated
Backgroundwhy this matters, and the conflict in 6 points
Why it matters
This is where three empires' borders were drawn and redrawn, and the seams are still load-bearing. A war ended here in 2023 after thirty-five years, a peace text was agreed in 2025, and neither event resolved the questions underneath — what the borders are, who guarantees them, and which roads and railways may cross them. It also matters to people with no stake in the region's politics: the corridors running through it carry Caspian energy to Europe and a growing share of the overland trade between China and the EU, on routes chosen specifically to avoid Russia and Iran. The Caucasus is small, and what happens to its transit geography is not.
The conflict in five minutes
6 points, composed from this conflict’s own sourced records — nothing here is a new claim.
This is several disputes, not one
Three separate files sit in this module and they do not resolve together: Armenia and Azerbaijan over Karabakh and their border; Georgia over Abkhazia and South Ossetia; and the North Caucasus inside Russia. They share a region, a set of external powers and a history — not a settlement, a timetable or a set of participants.
The Karabakh conflict ended, and its consequences did not
Azerbaijan recovered the territory in the 2020 war and took the remainder in a one-day operation in September 2023. Almost the entire Armenian population left within days, and the de facto entity dissolved. The fighting is over; return, property, heritage and the missing are not.
A peace text exists and has not been signed into force
Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed the text of a peace treaty in March 2025; their foreign ministers initialled it in Washington in August 2025 and their leaders signed a separate declaration the same day. It is still not signed. Azerbaijan conditions signature on an Armenian constitutional amendment, which requires a referendum slated for 2027. This module treats an agreed text and a concluded peace as different things.
Georgia's status question is frozen; its administration is not
Russia recognised Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent after the 2008 war; almost no other state has, and Georgia's territorial claim is unchanged. But calling the file static is wrong: in May 2026 Russia and the South Ossetian de facto authorities signed a treaty merging economic space and opening the entity's offices to Russian citizens, while Abkhazia rejected lesser terms and lost its electricity and budget support until its leadership changed. Nothing has moved on status and a great deal has moved underneath it.
Russia lost its monopoly without leaving
Russian peacekeepers left Karabakh in 2024, Armenia froze its participation in the Russian-led security bloc, Russian border guards have left every Armenian border checkpoint, and Türkiye, the EU and the United States have gained ground. Moscow's base at Gyumri remains on a lease running to 2044, its integration of the two Georgian entities has deepened, and its economic levers are intact. The right reading is lost arbitration, not absence — and nothing has yet replaced the role Russia played between Yerevan and Baku.
The corridors are the region's other subject
Oil and gas pipelines and the rail and road links of the Middle Corridor cross this region because they can avoid Russia and Iran. Which routes open, on whose terms and under whose control is now as central to the diplomacy as territory is — and several proposed routes do not yet exist.
The system, as analytical objectsWhat Vigil assesses about Caucasus, as 7 selectable objects. Each carries its own claims, registers, grades and dates, and each opens as itself in Explore — not as a section index.Open Caucasus in Explore
Vigil assessment
Constraints
What limits those options. A constraint is a structural limit, not a risk rating.
Vigil assessment · Observed
Trajectory
The module’s current phase — Peace texts, corridor bargaining and new alignments (2024 – 2026) — and the newest dated review.
Vigil assessment
External relationships
The standing arrangements this module authors between its parties. Each line is the record’s own signature; the analysis, dates and sources are on the record.
Observed
What matters now
The live questions this module leads with, each pointing at the record where it is being worked out.
Vigil assessment · Observed
Economy
5 exposure channels and 5 watch items, as of 2026-08.
Vigil assessment · Observed
Humanitarian
5 measured figures at regional granularity, as of 2026-08. No operational detail is published.
LatestThe newest published work on this conflict. Conflict reviewed 2026-09-06.Every dated review
Caucasus developments — 6 September 2026
Aliyev and Pashinyan met on the margins of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Bishkek on 31 August and published a joint press statement — the first time the two governments have jointly set out what normalisation has actually delivered rather than what it is supposed to deliver. The list is commercial: Azerbaijani petroleum products moving into Armenia, third-country grain transiting Azerbaijan to Armenia, trade relations being established, the delimitation commissions continuing, further practical steps on the TRIPP route. What is absent is as legible as what is present. The peace agreement is described as initialled, with no signature, no date, and no mention of the constitutional precondition that has blocked it since 2024. Yerevan's domestic prosecutions continued: a third judge withdrew from the case against the head of the Armenian Apostolic Church.
Theatre mapInteractive · approximate · as of 2026-07. Every marker here is a record, and the same markers are selectable in Explore's geography mode with the record open beside them.Open the map in Explore
Status and context zones
Loading map…
Interactive map — tiles © OpenStreetMap contributors, © CARTO. Markers show broad, publicly documented locations; sensitive sites are generalized to area level. Zone fills, where shown, are broad and approximate context with their own dates and confidence — never precise boundaries. The map does not show current deployments, activity or operational readiness, and is not suitable for operational use. Status is dated and contextual — see themethodology.
Status and context zones: broad · approximate · as of 2026-08 · Confidence: graded per zone
Interactive map — tiles © OpenStreetMap contributors, © CARTO. Markers show broad, publicly documented locations; sensitive sites are generalized to area level. Zone fills, where shown, are broad and approximate context with their own dates and confidence — never precise boundaries. The map does not show current deployments, activity or operational readiness, and is not suitable for operational use. Status is dated and contextual — see themethodology.
Status and context zones: broad · approximate · as of 2026-08 · Confidence: graded per zone
Zone legend — Status and context zones
Caucasus zones show de facto administration, historical conflict areas and broad corridor bands. They are status descriptions, not recognition claims, and never depict current military positions or an active front line.
- Abkhazia — de facto administered — De facto administered; recognised internationally as part of Georgia. As of 2026-06 · Confidence: High.
- South Ossetia / Tskhinvali region — de facto administered — De facto administered; recognised internationally as part of Georgia. As of 2026-08 · Confidence: High.
- Nagorno-Karabakh — historical conflict zone — Former Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone — under Azerbaijani control since 2023; Armenian population displaced. As of 2026-06 · Confidence: High.
- North Caucasus — historical war & insurgency zone — Historical war and insurgency zone inside Russia — context, not an active front. As of 2026-06 · Confidence: High.
- East–west corridor belt — Broad bands along energy and trade corridors — not routes or infrastructure maps. As of 2026-06 · Confidence: High.
Watch9 questions Vigil is tracking on Caucasus — each one a file it is following, not a forecast it is making.
Has the initialled peace agreement been signed?
The text was agreed in March 2025 and initialled by the two foreign ministers at the White House on 8 August 2025. It is not signed, and this module treats agreed, initialled, signed, ratified and implemented as five different states. The remaining stated obstacle is Azerbaijan's condition that Armenia first amend its constitution; Armenia's drafting council is to produce a text by the end of 2026 for a referendum slated for 2027, so the near-term observables are the draft's publication and a referendum date, not the signature itself. The OSCE Minsk Group's dissolution, long carried as an outstanding precondition, is done.
Operation recordHas TRIPP moved from framework and survey into construction?
The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity has accumulated instruments faster than works: a Washington declaration in August 2025, an Armenia–US implementation framework in January 2026 widening the scope from road and rail to a multimodal programme, a signed framework agreement in May 2026, and engineering surveys in Armenia reported under way in 2026. A survey is the point at which an alignment stops being notional; it is not construction. Nothing has been built on Armenian territory. The milestones that would change the finding are a final alignment, a contracting or financing close, a construction start, and an agreed customs and border-control arrangement — in that order.
Logistics recordsIs Armenia's realignment becoming institutional rather than declaratory?
Four things are true at once and are routinely collapsed into one. Armenia remains a de jure member of the CSTO; it has frozen participation since 2024 and has not paid contributions for a third consecutive year, which under Article 25 of the charter can cost it quota posts and voting rights. Russian border guards have left every Armenian border checkpoint — Zvartnots in 2024, the Iranian crossing from January 2025, Margara from March 2025, Akhurik from the start of 2026. The 102nd Military Base at Gyumri remains, on a lease running to 2044, and Armenia has not proposed changing that. And Armenia's Western ties are partnership and monitoring instruments, not security guarantees. Watch the CSTO's treatment of Armenia's standing, and whether any Western instrument acquires a defence commitment. Neither has happened.
Actor profilesIs Russian integration of the two Georgian entities deepening?
The status question is static and the administration is not. Russia and the de facto authorities in South Ossetia signed a Treaty on Deepening Allied Interaction on 9 May 2026, ratified by the Russian State Duma days later, providing for coordinated foreign, defence and security policy, a single economic space, staged integration of energy, transport and telecommunications, and the removal of citizenship restrictions on holding state and municipal office. Georgia calls it a step toward annexation; France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom state it has no validity in international law; the de facto president who signed it described it as a legal mechanism for future accession to Russia, then resigned in June 2026 into the Russian presidential administration. Abkhazia has resisted comparable terms and remains dependent on Russian energy and budget support. Watch which further instruments are concluded, and whether Abkhazia's resistance holds.
Operation record
5 further entriesthe rest of the standing watch list
Has delimitation extended beyond the 2024 Tavush section?
One section of border has been delimited since the mechanism was created: roughly a dozen kilometres in the Tavush direction in 2024, involving the transfer of four villages to Azerbaijani control. Delimitation is the agreement of a line on a map; demarcation is its marking on the ground, and the two are not interchangeable. The commissions have agreed the 1991 Alma-Ata Declaration and the Soviet-era maps in force at the time as the baseline. Watch which sections are taken up next and in what order — the Armenian-administered enclaves are the hardest of them, and one sits on Armenia's principal north–south road.
Has the Armenia–Türkiye border opened to any category of traveller?
It has not. The land border has been closed since 1993. Armenia and Türkiye agreed in July 2022, and reaffirmed in 2025, to open it to third-country nationals and holders of diplomatic passports; the Margara crossing on the Armenian side has been reported ready since 2023, and Armenia says it is waiting on Turkish implementation. What has changed is adjacent rather than at the border: Armenia has allowed Azerbaijani lorries bound for Türkiye to transit its territory since late 2025. A first crossing by any category of traveller would be the marker; announcements about readiness have recurred for four years.
Are the unresolved human files moving, or hardening?
The territorial question was closed by force in 2023. The consequences were not, and in 2026 one of them moved in the direction of closure against the displaced rather than toward settlement: a Baku court sentenced fifteen former Karabakh officials in February 2026, five to life imprisonment, with a separate twenty-year sentence for Ruben Vardanyan, and an appeal court upheld the verdicts in August 2026. Neither the initialled treaty nor the Washington declaration commits Azerbaijan to release anyone. The other files — some 4,500 missing recorded by the ICRC, property and return claims, mine clearance measured in decades — are unmoved. Watch any release, any return framework, and whether these files are named in the settlement at all.
Are the corridors carrying more, and is any of it new geography?
The material test of whether the region's diplomacy produces connectivity. Middle Corridor volumes rose steeply after 2022 from a small base and are reported on differing bases in the 4.5–5.2 million tonne range for 2025, with container traffic around 77,000 TEU; the binding constraints are Caspian ferry capacity, port throughput and the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars line, not demand. Azerbaijani gas to the EU was about 12.8 bcm in 2025, essentially flat, against expansion commitments that depend on fields not yet producing. Watch whether growth continues, and separately whether any of it crosses a border that was closed — which is the only kind of increase the settlement would explain.
Does the Chechen succession question produce an observable event?
The module covers the North Caucasus as a Russian interior security system and holds it at structural level: Chechnya's stability is an arrangement with one man, the succession question is discussed openly, and Dagestan has produced the region's worst recent attacks. Vigil publishes no incident counter here and makes no prediction. The observable is a formal change in the Chechen leadership or its designated succession, which is the only development that would require this module to reassess the arrangement rather than describe it.
Evidence and review status
- Conflict reviewed
- 2026-09-06— the date of this conflict’s most recent verified Weekly Brief. It records a review of the conflict as a whole, not a revalidation of every underlying record; each record carries its own date.
- Assessed as of
- 2026-07 — the date this conflict’s standing geographic and situational claims are drawn to.
- Review cadence
- Weekly review / event-driven updates — quiet weeks are published as quiet reviews rather than as silence.
Scope of this coverage. This is regional-system coverage, not a single-conflict frame: it covers the Caucasus as a connected system across four sub-theatres, with a historical and structural focus. It does not track daily events, and it does not map current military positions anywhere.
Source registryMethodologyCorrections logGlossary
Found an error in Caucasus coverage? Corrections are logged in public with the date and what changed — see the corrections log.