VIGIL CONSILIUMSearch
Context. Not headlines.

Campaign

The February 2022 invasion and the failure at Kyiv

The four-axis opening campaign that assumed a state would collapse in days, and the six weeks that proved it would not.

February – April 20224 phases4 linked eventsThe eastern front

Concluded
Assessed as of
2022-05
Last reviewed
2026-07-26

AssessmentHigh confidence

Context, not targeting. Campaign records describe objectives, participants, phases and outcomes at the level of published analysis; they contain no current positions, force ratios, unit locations or strengths.

In short

Russia's multi-axis invasion of February 2022 aimed at rapid political collapse rather than at defeating an army, and failed at Kyiv within six weeks. The withdrawal from the north converted a planned regime change into the attritional war that followed, and set both sides' subsequent posture.

Summary

Russian forces entered Ukraine on multiple axes on 24 February 2022 — from Belarus toward Kyiv, from the north-east toward Kharkiv and Sumy, from the Donbas, and from Crimea into the south. The design assumed the Ukrainian state would collapse quickly: airborne troops seized Hostomel airport outside Kyiv on the first day in an attempt to open an air bridge, columns advanced on road axes with limited infantry protection, and the operation was conducted with a secrecy that left many Russian units unaware of their mission until it began. Hostomel was contested and the air bridge never opened. The northern advance stalled on constrained forested and marshy approaches, and Russian forces withdrew from the Kyiv, Chernihiv and Sumy axes by early April. In the south, the campaign achieved its most durable result: a land corridor to Crimea, taken at the cost of the siege and destruction of Mariupol.

Why it matters

Everything after this campaign is shaped by its failure. It converted an intended coup de main into an attritional war neither side had planned or resourced; it established that Ukraine would fight and that Western states would supply it; it produced the atrocities at Bucha that ended any prospect of an early negotiated settlement; and it delivered the southern land corridor that remains Russia's most significant territorial gain and the object of every subsequent Ukrainian offensive.

Stated objectives

What the participants say. Each entry cites where the position was stated; Vigil records that it was made, not that it is true.

Assessed objectives

Vigil's reading, graded. Kept structurally apart from stated positions so an assessment can never be published as someone's declared aim.

Primary forces

  • Armed Forces of Russia Primary force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-04

    The invading force as a whole. Component commands are recorded separately where the module publishes them.

Opposing forces

  • Armed Forces of Ukraine Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-04
  • National Guard Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-05

    National Guard formations, including the Azov Regiment, were central to the defence of Mariupol.

  • Territorial Defence Forces Opposing force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-04

    Territorial Defence expanded enormously in the opening weeks and held urban approaches the regular army could not cover simultaneously.

Supporting & external

  • Airborne Forces (VDV) Supporting force · Confidence: High · as of 2022-02

    The Hostomel air-assault operation on the first day is the clearest documented VDV action of the campaign and its clearest failure.

Phases

March 2022Confidence: High

The northern advance stalls

The advance on Kyiv did not develop. Constrained approaches, unprotected road columns, ambushed logistics and a defence that did not collapse produced a stalled envelopment rather than a seizure. The air bridge was never opened.

Sources: ISW campaign assessments · RUSI component and capability analyses

Outcome and present status

A failed campaign with one durable achievement. Russia did not take Kyiv, did not replace the government, and withdrew entirely from the northern axes within six weeks; it did establish and retain a land corridor from the Donbas to Crimea. The strategic result was to convert a war designed to end in days into one measured in years, on terms — attrition, industrial supply, political endurance — that neither side had prepared for.

Observed adaptations

Political implications

Bucha ended the Istanbul negotiating track and made a negotiated settlement politically unavailable in Kyiv for the foreseeable future.

Military implications

Established that the Russian army could not conduct a rapid deep operation against a defended state, and that Ukraine could absorb an opening blow.

Humanitarian implications

Produced the war's largest single displacement wave and, at Mariupol, its most complete destruction of a major city.

What remains unknown

  • Russian planning documents are not public. The intended timetable and objectives are inferred from force composition, axis selection and captured material rather than from disclosure.
  • Casualty figures for the opening period are contested by an order of magnitude between the parties and are not stated here.
  • The Istanbul negotiations of March–April 2022 have been described inconsistently by participants, and what was actually on the table remains disputed.

Readings the evidence also supports

  • The failure at Kyiv can be read as the collapse of a bad plan, or as a deliberate fixing operation intended to hold Ukrainian forces in the north while the south was taken. The second reading is asserted mainly by Russian officials after the fact; the force composition and the losses sustained fit the first more closely, but the module records that both readings exist.
  • The withdrawal from the north can be read as a defeat or as a negotiated de-escalation gesture during the Istanbul talks, which were live at the time. The subsequent revelation at Bucha makes the distinction largely academic in its effects, but not in what it implies about Russian decision-making.

Listed because the record's own assessment is not the only one its sources permit — not as a hedge on the assessment above.

What to watch

How the campaign is retrospectively described by both governments

Both have revised their public account of the opening period. Changes in how it is narrated track changes in what each is preparing to accept in any settlement.

Accountability processes for Bucha and Mariupol

International investigations continue. Their progress is the clearest measure of whether the campaign's civilian record has legal consequences.

See the force running this in Explore Interactive: select this record and follow what connects to it.

Assessed as of2022-05Last reviewed2026-07-26

Related structure

13 records that this campaign names, or that name it. Every one is an explicit reference in a published record — nothing here is inferred from subject matter.

Participants

Organisations this campaign names, with the role it states.

Events inside it

Dated events this campaign places within itself.

Systems it depends on