Sieges around the north, a militia-based state response, and the region's largest displacement — with almost no published count of any of it.
Relationships
The standing arrangements between the actors in this module, each as a record with its own dates, sources and confidence: what the arrangement covers, when it began, what last changed it, and what remains unclear. Vigil publishes no measure of how strong or how hostile a relationship is — the description and its evidence are the record.
Two insurgencies fighting each other over the same ground, with civilians between them.
An insurgency that has offered to talk and a state that has refused to, now contesting the roads rather than the towns.
The broker of every Malian peace deal, estranged for fifteen months over a drone, and back at the table by August 2026.
A country that left the bloc and keeps its fuel inside it — in tank farms on other states' territory.
It left the institution and kept the ports — which is the opening an armed group turned into a strategy.
A landlocked state whose principal route to the sea was closed by politics, not by fighting — and only partly replaced since.
Founding membership of a bloc whose common enemies cross its internal borders more fluidly than its own forces do.
Out with the other two in January 2025 — and still importing almost everything it consumes through the bloc it left.
The state that broke first, in the bloc that turned its break into an institution.
Sanctioned to force an election, radicalised instead, and gone by January 2025 — the first of three.
The member that hosts the bloc's joint command, its Russian interlocutor and, in August 2026, a mutiny in the same capital.
Sanctioned after the 2023 coup, out by January 2025, and still routing its trade through the neighbour that closed the border.
A defence relationship that asks for nothing — which is the whole of its appeal, and the reason it outlasted the Western one.
An instructor contingent an order of magnitude smaller than Mali's, an expansion that did not happen, and a partial recall.
Combat manpower and political cover, bought with mining revenue and paid for in reputation.
The one deployment Moscow has publicly admitted fought — once, at an airport, in January 2026.
The moment three separate security relationships acquired a single counterparty.
A settlement torn up in 2024 and a front formed to replace it, contesting Kidal and the idea of Azawad.
Descriptive records, not ratings. There is no field anywhere in this layer for relationship strength, warmth, hostility or direction of travel, and none may be added. Change is carried by the validity period, the recorded last material change and the linked events — each of which a reader can check. See the methodology.