AES states & allied forces
Malian Defence and Security Forces (FDS)
The state military establishment — army, air force, national guard and gendarmerie — under the transitional military government.
Context, not targeting. This atlas describes structure and history. It deliberately excludes current locations, live strength, unit movements and anything operationally sensitive — the content model has no fields for them. Branch depth reflects what can be established from public sources, not the size, capability or importance of a force: a thin branch means a state publishes little, and record counts are never a measure of strength.
Current state
Records assessed as of 2026-10
How the forces on each side are organised — formations, lineage and subordination, never locations or strength.
AES states & allied forces
The state military establishment — army, air force, national guard and gendarmerie — under the transitional military government.
AES states & allied forces
The national armed forces of Burkina Faso — the institution that has produced two coups and governs through the second, fighting an insurgency across most of the country with a mass civilian auxiliary alongside it.
AES states & allied forces
The national armed forces of Niger — the institution that took power in 2023, expelled two Western partners, and in August 2026 fought a mutiny drawn from its own western garrisons.
AES states & allied forces
The confederation's joint military command — inaugurated in December 2025 with a named commander and a stated strength, and not yet observed operating.
AES states & allied forces
A navigation grouping, not a command: armed movements and communal self-defence forces that have fought alongside or in parallel with the state. Each member’s real relationship to the government differs and is stated on its record — a historical northern coalition beside communal militias that published research describes as a fragmented ensemble rather than an actor.
External security partners
A navigation grouping, not a command: the Russian deployments in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger differ in scale, posture and evidence, and are recorded separately for that reason. What they share since 2025 is an institution — the Ministry of Defence's Africa Corps, successor to the Wagner deployment — and a sustainment chain that runs through the Russian state.
Azawad movements
A navigation grouping, not a command: the separatist and allied movements of northern Mali, from the 2012 rebellion through the CMA and CSP coalitions to the unified FLA of 2024 — one lineage with several coalition names, plus the Ménaka movement that took a different path. Lineage relationships are stated on each record.
JNIM & lineage
The al-Qaeda-aligned insurgent coalition formed in 2017 under Iyad Ag Ghaly — the strongest non-state force in the war.
JNIM & lineage
AQIM offshoot that ruled Gao during the 2012 occupation; both of today’s rival jihadist lineages trace through its remnants.
Islamic State Sahel
The Islamic State’s Sahel province — a separate project from JNIM and at war with it; strongest in the tri-border zone.
Regional & international (historical)
A navigation grouping, not a command: the French, UN, European and regional forces of the intervention era, 2013–2024 — Serval and Barkhane, MINUSMA, Takuba, EUTM Mali and the G5 Sahel joint force. Each ran under its own mandate and institution, and each has ended or withdrawn from Mali; the grouping exists so the sequence of departures can be read as one story.
Structure. Each side is a set of trees: state military, interior forces, and browsing groups. A record marked “Grouping · not a command” exists only so related organisations can be found together — its members do not share a command, and each states its real parent institution.
Record states. A full profile has passed source review. A stub is an honest structural placeholder — name, place in the tree, broad role, and a dated status — awaiting research. Records that cannot yet meet even that threshold are held internally and do not appear on the site at all.
Subordination grades. Parent links are graded:confirmed, reported, disputed,historical, or unknown. Where a current parent cannot be verified — as with brigades amid Ukraine's rolling corps reform — the record says unknown rather than inventing precision.
Lineage, not amnesia. Reorganised, merged or disbanded organisations keep their records, marked with dated predecessor and successor links — Wagner's absorption after 2023 and the Donetsk and Luhansk corps are carried this way, never as if unchanged.
Every record carries a status as of date for its claims and a separate reviewed date for editorial checks — a review never silently refreshes a status date.
Dated changes the records in this module state about themselves, and the corrections the public log records against this atlas — newest first.
The note dated the relief-convoy ambush near Tabrichat to 9 July 2026. The module's supply-convoy series records Tabrichat on 5 July and Tin Araban on 9 July; the note now gives both dates correctly.
Returned to Kidal on the ground: the general staff announced air-ground operations in the region "with its Russian partners", and Africa Corps personnel rode in the roughly 120-vehicle column from Anéfis that entered the town without resistance, as AFP's officers and RFI described it. The corps had withdrawn from the town in April.
Withdrew from Kidal, taken in April 2026, as strikes on the town and on Tinzaouatène intensified from 4 October and a column of Malian soldiers, Africa Corps personnel and MSA and GATIA fighters approached from Anéfis; it announced a "strategic and controlled" withdrawal it called temporary, and a cadre told RFI the decision was taken with JNIM. The town was entered without resistance.
Left Kidal, held with the FLA since late April 2026, without fighting for it as the Malian army and Africa Corps re-entered the town under air cover; an FLA cadre told RFI the withdrawal was decided with JNIM. The fighters and vehicles withdrew into the surrounding desert; no position is recorded.
Took over the Wagner deployment's role in Mali after Wagner posted "mission accomplished" on 6 June 2025; the defence-ministry-run successor had been building up from late 2024.
Full history on the corrections log.