本頁部分內容仍以英文正本呈現:相關譯文尚未完成。 英文版本

Strike UAV / loitering munition · Iranian-derived one-way attack and reconnaissance UAVs, with first-person-view drones reported from 2026

真主黨無人機系列

真主黨操作的無人機,以系列記錄:Alma將其年代定為2002–03年、並認為源自伊朗Mohajer系列的Mirsad偵察與攻擊型;FDD與Alma描述為其主要單程攻擊無人機的Ababil-T;Alma認為源自見證者-129的Ayub;以及以色列與區域媒體自2026年4月起報導、作為在黎巴嫩境內對付以色列部隊之主要武器的小型第一人稱視角無人機,其中部分為光纖導引。Alma提出的其他候選型號(Mohajer、Shahed、Samad、Karrar、Saegheh)是其估計,未經證實已服役。

Hezbollah one-way attack, reconnaissance and first-person-view drones, by family 伊朗 Mirsad-1 in service from 2002 and Mirsad-2 from 2003 by Alma's account; one-way attack use documented from 2023; FPV use reported from 2026

狀態截至
2026-10
最後檢視
2026-10-29

評估中等信心

提供辨識背景,而非性能數據表。本目錄涵蓋與Vigil所關注之衝突相關的主要公開記載系統——並非詳盡的戰鬥序列。不記錄任何數量、可用狀況或當前配置。

紀錄 此系統是什麼、源自何處、由誰使用,以及與Vigil的哪些模組相關——並附上每一項所依據的證據。

有實戰紀錄 證據:已證實
剪影 · 未按比例

紀錄

系列Hezbollah one-way attack, reconnaissance and first-person-view drones, by family
衍生型Mirsad-1; Mirsad-2; Ababil-T; Ayub; Ma'arab; Rami-1; FPV drones (including fibre-optic-guided)
原產地伊朗
年代Mirsad-1 in service from 2002 and Mirsad-2 from 2003 by Alma's account; one-way attack use documented from 2023; FPV use reported from 2026
出現於2023–24年以色列–真主黨敵對行動 · 2026年黎巴嫩戰爭

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的模組相關;各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Hezbollah: Used for reconnaissance and attack against northern Israel in 2023–24 and in the 2026 war; the IDF reports explosive drones launched at its forces inside Lebanon after the 19 June 2026 ceasefire (29 July, early September and 23 September–5 October 2026), which are IDF claims not matched by a UN detection.

戰場角色

Reconnaissance over northern Israel and over Israeli forces in Lebanon, one-way attack at ranges that reach beyond the border area, and, from 2026, short-range precision attack on vehicles and positions with FPV drones — the function the module's "drone unit" organisation record names.

優勢

Low cost and low radar signature relative to rockets, and a growing share of the attack effort: Alma's analysis records drones as a markedly larger share of Hezbollah's attacks in March 2026 than in October 2024, and described them as the primary means of warfare in the week of 17–24 May 2026. The Ababil-T is described by FDD as Hezbollah's main one-way attack drone; no range or payload figure is carried, under the module's ceiling.

限制

Vulnerable to interception, with Israel's layered air defence and aircraft credited with most shoot-downs; the named types' present numbers and production are not established by any source read; and the identification of individual drones in 2026 attacks rests on Israeli statements and press rather than on a UN detection, since UNIFIL's radar count does not separate drones from other projectiles.

有文件記錄的衝突使用

Reconnaissance flights over Israel from 2004 onward (Alma); attack use across the 2023–24 front and the 2026 war; after the 19 June 2026 ceasefire, IDF statements of explosive drones launched at its forces near Ali al-Taher (29 July) and elsewhere in southern Lebanon (September and early October 2026), recorded on the module's Watch as attributed claims.

有文件記錄的部隊

評估截至 — 2026-10 最近檢視 — 2026-10-29