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Missile / precision strike · Unguided artillery rockets to short-range ballistic missiles, Iranian and Syrian supply, recorded by family

真主黨火箭與飛彈系列

真主黨自1990年代以來向以色列射擊所用的火箭與飛彈系列:蘇聯型107公釐與122公釐砲兵火箭、伊朗的Falaq、Fajr與Zelzal系列、源自敘利亞的Raad與Khaibar-1(M-302)、Fateh-110短程彈道飛彈及其敘利亞仿製品M-600,以及真主黨自身聲明與Alma的2026年清單在2024年與2026年射擊中所指名的Burkan、Arash與Fadi系列。依所稱來源與已公布的射程等級以系列記錄;不載列任何庫存、發射器數量、發射區域或儲存地點。

Hezbollah artillery rockets and short-range missiles, by family 伊朗、敘利亞 1990s onward; the heavier Fajr, Zelzal and Fateh-110 families from the 2000s; the Burkan and Fadi series named in the 2024 and 2026 fire

狀態截至
2026-06
最後檢視
2026-10-29

評估中等信心

提供辨識背景,而非性能數據表。本目錄涵蓋與Vigil所關注之衝突相關的主要公開記載系統——並非詳盡的戰鬥序列。不記錄任何數量、可用狀況或當前配置。

紀錄 此系統是什麼、源自何處、由誰使用,以及與Vigil的哪些模組相關——並附上每一項所依據的證據。

有實戰紀錄 證據:已證實
剪影 · 未按比例

紀錄

系列Hezbollah artillery rockets and short-range missiles, by family
衍生型107 mm and 122 mm Katyusha/Grad-type; Falaq-1; Falaq-2; Fajr-3; Fajr-5; Raad-2/Raad-3; Khaibar-1 (M-302); Zelzal-1; Zelzal-2; Fateh-110; M-600 (Tishreen); Burkan; Arash; Fadi-1; Fadi-2; Fadi-6
原產地伊朗、敘利亞
年代1990s onward; the heavier Fajr, Zelzal and Fateh-110 families from the 2000s; the Burkan and Fadi series named in the 2024 and 2026 fire
出現於2023–24年以色列–真主黨敵對行動 · 2026年黎巴嫩戰爭

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的模組相關;各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Hezbollah: Fired into Israel from 8 October 2023 to the cessation of 27 November 2024 and from 2 March to the ceasefire of 19 June 2026. UNIFIL counted 6,929 north-to-south trajectories across the Blue Line between 21 February and 20 June 2026, "many of which did not cross south of the Blue Line" (S/2026/566); it attributes the count to no party and each trajectory may be several projectiles.

戰場角色

Volume indirect fire against northern Israel at short range and, with the heavier families, strikes toward Haifa and central Israel — the function the module's "rocket and missile forces" organisation record exists to name, and the fire that Israel's interceptor layers exist to meet.

Typical employment

Salvo fire from dispersed and concealed launch points at populated areas and military sites in northern Israel, with heavier single rounds at longer range — at the level published analysis describes; no launch area, procedure or sequencing is recorded.

How the system is commonly used, at the level of published analysis — never a procedure, a loadout or an engagement envelope.

優勢

Numbers and dispersal rather than precision: the open-source accounts CSIS relays describe an arsenal built to saturate interceptors with volume fire, with a smaller number of heavier families reaching central Israel. Published estimates of the arsenal's size differ by an order of magnitude between sources and dates; under the module's ceiling (categories, never inventories) none is carried.

限制

Mostly unguided, and Israeli-aligned analysts report a high failure rate in the 2026 fire. The launch areas and storage that make the families usable were the declared target set of Israel's 2024 and 2026 air campaigns, and no source read states what survives. The heaviest families (Scud transfers reported from Syria) are unconfirmed in CSIS's own account.

有文件記錄的衝突使用

The 2006 war; the front opened from Lebanon on 8 October 2023 and the Israeli campaign of September–November 2024; and the 2026 war, in which Alma's analysis records rockets and missiles as the majority of Hezbollah's attacks, a smaller share than in October 2024 as drone use grew. UNIFIL last detected Hezbollah projectiles on 21 June 2026, according to Security Council Report; UNIFIL said in May 2025 that it had referred 225 caches found since the November 2024 cessation to the Lebanese army, and on 26 January 2026 more than 400 caches and pieces of infrastructure, without stating their contents.

有文件記錄的部隊

評估截至 — 2026-06 最近檢視 — 2026-10-29