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Artillery · Improvised and Iranian-derived artillery rockets, unguided, recorded by family

加薩火箭系列

加薩武裝團體的砲兵火箭:從卡桑旅於2001年開始發射的短程Qassam與122公釐Grad型火箭,到自2012年起射及特拉維夫與耶路撒冷的本地製M-75、J-80與R-160,再到Fajr-5與M-302等進口火箭,以及卡桑旅於2021年宣布的Ayyash-250;聖城旅則將Badr-3呈現為其自有火箭。以系列記錄;不載列任何數量、射程數字、生產地點、發射區域或戰後存量數字。

Locally produced and imported artillery rockets of the Gaza armed groups, by family 巴勒斯坦、伊朗 Qassam from 2001; longer-range locally built families from 2012; the Ayyash-250 announced in 2021

狀態截至
2026-07-30
最後檢視
2026-10-29

評估中等信心

提供辨識背景,而非性能數據表。本目錄涵蓋與Vigil所關注之衝突相關的主要公開記載系統——並非詳盡的戰鬥序列。不記錄任何數量、可用狀況或當前配置。

紀錄 此系統是什麼、源自何處、由誰使用,以及與Vigil的哪些模組相關——並附上每一項所依據的證據。

有實戰紀錄 證據:已證實
剪影 · 未按比例

紀錄

系列Locally produced and imported artillery rockets of the Gaza armed groups, by family
衍生型Qassam; 122 mm Grad-type; M-75; J-80; R-160; M-302; Fajr-5; Badr-3; Ayyash-250
原產地巴勒斯坦、伊朗
年代Qassam from 2001; longer-range locally built families from 2012; the Ayyash-250 announced in 2021
出現於2023–25年加薩戰爭

衝突關聯性

這是本目錄中此系統的唯一紀錄。它與下方的模組相關;各模組的Force Atlas會顯示它在該處的使用方式。

使用方

Hamas: The Qassam Brigades name their own types and fired them in every round since 2001 and in the war from 7 October 2023; whether fire from Gaza has occurred since the 10 October 2025 ceasefire is not documented in any source read. · Palestinian Islamic Jihad: The al-Quds Brigades fire Grad-type rockets and present the Badr-3 as their own type; their holdings are not separable from Hamas's in any source read.

戰場角色

Unguided volume fire at Israeli towns and, with the longer-range families, at central Israel, designed to force interceptions and sirens rather than to hit a point target; the objects the Board of Peace roadmap's decommissioning line would inventory, store and verify.

優勢

Local production from available materials, which no closure regime has stopped, and range growth by family, from the short-range Qassam to families that reached Tel Aviv and Jerusalem from 2012. Published estimates of the stock, Israeli and INSS, differ widely between 2021 and 2023; under the module's ceiling (categories, never inventories) no stock figure or family range is carried.

限制

No guidance, so effect depends on volume against a layered interceptor system; the 2023–25 war destroyed production and storage on a scale no source quantifies, and what survives west of the Yellow Line is not established. The sources disagree on designations — press in 2021 treated the Badr-3 as a short-range Grad-class rocket while INSS in 2023 equates it with the R-160 — and the record does not reconcile them.

與戰役的關聯

推導所得:這些戰役中的一個參與組織,與此系統有一筆具類型的裝備關聯。這並不等同於有文件記錄該系統在戰役本身中的使用。

  • 以色列的加薩戰爭 Since 7 October 2023

    via Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades (Documented, high confidence); al-Quds Brigades (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) (Documented, moderate confidence)

  • 約旦河西岸北部難民營戰役 Since 28 August 2024

    via al-Quds Brigades (Palestinian Islamic Jihad) (Documented, moderate confidence)

有文件記錄的衝突使用

Rocket fire in every Gaza round from 2001 to 2023 and in the war from 7 October 2023, documented by the IDF, the UN and the groups' own claims; the 30 July 2026 roadmap requires Hamas and the factions to inventory and store weapons under international verification, and no inventory has been published.

有文件記錄的部隊

評估截至 — 2026-07-30 最近檢視 — 2026-10-29