Ce qu’est ce système
Ukraine's grid lost roughly half its dispatchable generation in the first year of the war and runs on repair, European interconnection and imported fuel; Russia's refining tier, not its crude output, is what Ukrainian deep strike has reached since 2024, reaching Russian motorists as rationing in 2026.
Generation decides whether households have heat, light and pumped water in winter, whether industry including the defence industry can operate, and how much of the budget goes to imported electricity and repair. Refining decides whether Russian crude abundance becomes Russian product availability. The system is where the military, economic and humanitarian dimensions of the war become one subject.
Confiance : modérée Au 2026-09-30Revu le 2026-10-04
Le système
- Vue d’ensemble
- Ukraine entered the war with a generation mix dominated by nuclear, supported by hydro on the Dnipro and thermal plant, and a refining sector in long decline. On the IEA's figures available dispatchable generation was roughly 38 GW before 2022; occupation, destruction and damage removed about 19 GW in the first year; concentrated attacks in spring 2024 brought the figure to about 12 GW; some 3 GW was restored before the 2024/25 winter and repair has continued since. Synchronisation with the European grid in 2022 made imports a standing part of supply, and liquid fuel is now overwhelmingly imported through the western land corridors. The largest nuclear station, at Zaporizhzhia, has been under Russian control since 2022 with all six reactors shut since 2024. On the other side of the same system, Russia produces around nine million barrels of crude a day but reaches its own motorists only through refineries, and that tier — concentrated in the Volga and central regions, behind the Black Sea coast and in Siberia — has been the principal object of the Ukrainian deep-strike campaign since 2024, at increasing depth.
- Current state · as of 2026-09-30
- Strike tempo on the Ukrainian grid stayed active through September 2026 and the target set widened; Ukrenergo reported new outages in six regions after the attacks to 25 September, and on 30 September Russia mounted what Ukraine's prime minister called the first massive combined attack on the energy system since the last heating season. On the Russian side, refinery throughput fell to about 3.6 million barrels a day in July 2026 on commercial estimates, roughly a third below the seasonal norm; purchase limits returned at filling stations in the Moscow region in August; Reuters attributes the shortages to strikes, seasonal demand and unscheduled maintenance together, and the published data does not separate them. From 28 September a presidential decree bars publication of refinery-level output and export data.
- Documented exposure
- At the level the IEA and the IAEA publish: the capacity series above, the off-site power supply of the Zaporizhzhia station as a standing IAEA concern, and the refinery-throughput estimate carried by Bloomberg. No facility-level state is published here.
- Commodities and outputs
- Natural gas · Crude & products
Nœuds
The published markers that carry this system value, by the module’s own priority. A note is the system record’s; a marker without one is a member by its own tag.
- Raffinerie de Kstovo (Lukoil-Nizhegorodnefteorgsintez)Raffinerie
- Centrale nucléaire de KourskNuclear facility · generalized
- Raffinerie de Moscou (Kapotnya)Raffinerie
The capital's refinery at Kapotnya, halted on the last day of the September 2026 Duma vote.
- Complexe de raffinage de Nizhnekamsk (TANECO)Raffinerie
The Nizhnekamsk complex, struck on 10 August 2026 roughly 1,200 km from the Ukrainian border — the deepest strike of the war.
- Centrale nucléaire de NovovoronezhNuclear facility · generalized
- Raffinerie d’OmskRaffinerie
- Centrale nucléaire de RostovNuclear facility · generalized
- Raffinerie de RyazanRaffinerie
- Port d’Ust-LugaPort
- Raffinerie de VolgogradRaffinerie
- Raffinerie de Yaroslavl (Slavneft-YANOS)Raffinerie
- Centrale nucléaire de ZaporizhzhiaNuclear facility · generalized
Ukraine's largest nuclear station, under Russian control since 2022 and not generating — a production source removed from the system rather than one within it.
- Raffinerie d’AfipskyRaffinerie
- Barrage et centrale DniproHESCentrale électrique
- Raffinerie d’IlskyRaffinerie
- Raffinerie de KremenchukRaffinerie
Ukraine's principal refining capacity before the war; domestic refining has not been a significant share of supply since 2022.
- Raffinerie de NovokuibyshevskRaffinerie
- Raffinerie de NovoshakhtinskRaffinerie
- Raffinerie de PermRaffinerie
- Complexe de raffinage et de pétrochimie de SalavatRaffinerie
- Raffinerie de SaratovRaffinerie
- Raffinerie de Slavyansk-na-KubaniRaffinerie
- Raffinerie de SyzranRaffinerie
- Pôle de raffinage d’UfaRaffinerie
Routes and operators
Supply systems running through it
- Production d’électricité et approvisionnement en carburantFuel imports · 7 nodes · 5 documented disruptions · named by the recordLe système qui décide si un pays en guerre peut être chauffé, éclairé et maintenu en activité — et celui qui est attaqué précisément pour cette raison.
- Raffinage du brut et approvisionnement intérieur en carburantFuel imports · 10 nodes · 3 documented disruptions · named by the recordLe maillon entre un producteur de pétrole et une station-service qui fonctionne — et le seul point du système énergétique russe où une pénurie est tout simplement possible.
Organisations that run it
- RosneftEnergy company · ActiveRussia's largest state-controlled oil company, operator of several of the Volga refineries the module publishes as markers and a party to the refined-product shortfall of 2026.
- Gazprom NeftEnergy company · ActiveThe Gazprom group's oil arm, operator of the Moscow, Omsk and Salavat refining complexes the module publishes as markers — one of them Russia's largest by throughput.
- LukoilEnergy company · ActiveA privately held Russian oil company, operator of the Volgograd and Perm refineries the module publishes as markers, both struck repeatedly in the 2026 campaign.
- NaftogazState enterprise · ActiveUkraine's state oil and gas company, which imported several billion cubic metres of gas for the 2025–26 heating season after strikes on production and storage, financed externally.
- UkrenergoInfrastructure operator · ActiveUkraine's transmission system operator, whose outage and restriction statements are the operator source the module reads for the state of the grid under strike.
Dependencies and constraints
Each marked documented (a published source states it) or assessed (Vigil infers it and says so). The two are never drawn the same way.
European grid interconnection. The only fast-acting relief available to Ukrainian supply, and finite: firm import capacity was set at 2.1 GW for winter and 1.7 GW for summer as of December 2024, against a winter peak demand the IEA puts at 18 GW in 2023/24 and 16.5 GW in 2024/25. Imports are a margin, not a substitute.
The western land corridors. Imported refined fuel depends entirely on the same corridors that carry military supply, so a constraint on those corridors is simultaneously a fuel constraint.
The Russian refining tier. Crude reaches Russian consumers only through refining; producing more crude does not substitute for it, and the tier is capital intensive, slow to repair and dependent on process equipment sanctions have made harder to source.
Transmission and a small number of nuclear sites. Three nuclear plants carry about half of Ukraine's generation capacity on the IEA's accounting — roughly 7.7 GW — which concentrates an unusual share of the system in few sites and in the transmission that connects them. The concentration is the exposure; nothing here says what state it is in.
Electricity cannot be stockpiled: generation lost is generation unavailable until repaired or replaced, and the long-lead components involved take many months to source.
Falling Russian product exports can be read as lost capacity or as deliberate reallocation under the export ban; the ban makes the two indistinguishable in the export figures.
Russia mounted what Ukraine's prime minister called the first massive combined attack on the energy system since the end of the last heating season, aimed chiefly at Kyiv and Kyiv oblast, and emergency outages were applied in Kyiv and in Kyiv, Chernihiv and Zhytomyr oblasts. The IAEA separately reported transformers feeding the Zaporizhzhia site's off-site supply damaged on 19, 20 and 27 September.
A presidential decree barred publication of refinery-level output, refined-product export and customs data unless the company discloses it, and on 30 September the producer diesel export ban was extended to 31 October. The refining side of this system is now observable mainly through company disclosure and independent tracking.
Strike tempo on the Ukrainian grid stayed active and the target set widened; Ukrenergo reported new outages in six regions after the attacks to 25 September and applied no scheduled outages.
The Moscow refinery at Kapotnya halted on the last day of the Duma vote.
The deepest strike of the war hit the Nizhnekamsk complex, roughly 1,200 km from the Ukrainian border.
Purchase limits returned at filling stations in Moscow and the surrounding region, with operators publishing caps of 30 to 60 litres per vehicle.
Chaînes de transmission passant par ce système
Each step carries its own basis grade — Confirmed, Plausible exposure, Unconfirmed scenario — and a chain can only weaken from left to right.
- Frappes sur les raffineries → déficit de raffinage → disponibilité intérieure des carburantsEconomic exposure · as of 2026-09-30
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- significance Exposition plausible
- Campagne contre le réseau → déficit de production → production industrielle et finances publiquesEconomic exposure · as of 2026-08
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- significance Exposition plausible
- Campagne contre le réseau → chauffage, eau et services de santé en hiverCivilian impact · as of 2026-08
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- significance Exposition plausible
- Sanctions et plafonnement des prix → brut décoté → capacité budgétaire russeEconomic exposure · as of 2026-07
- asset Confirmé
- disruption Confirmé
- exposure Confirmé
- significance Exposition plausible
Watch questions bearing on it
- Les réparations et les importations peuvent-elles aller plus vite que la campagne de frappes avant l’hiver ?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Le secteur russe du raffinage absorbe-t-il la campagne de frappes, ou la contrainte s’aggrave-t-elle ?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- L’approvisionnement en intercepteurs parvient-il à l’Ukraine plus vite qu’il n’est consommé ?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
- Frapper la flotte fantôme fait-il réellement bouger les volumes d’exportation russes ?active · Movement observed 2026-11-01
Events at its nodes
Economic exposures it underlies
Actors and arrangements
Ce qui reste inconnu
- No clean published figure exists for the winter 2025/26 generation outcome; the record states so rather than interpolating one.
- Which Russian facilities are currently degraded is not published by the module, by rule.
- From 28 September 2026 a Russian presidential decree bars publication of refinery-level output, export and customs data unless the company discloses it, which removes the Russian-side series this record used.
Lectures que les éléments permettent aussi
- Russian product shortages have three published causes — strikes, seasonal demand and unscheduled maintenance — and the data does not separate them.
Figure ici parce que l’évaluation propre à la fiche n’est pas la seule que ses sources permettent — et non comme une réserve sur l’évaluation ci-dessus.
Ouvrir dans Explorer Interactif : sélectionnez cette fiche et suivez ce qui s’y rattache.
Évalué au — 2026-09-30 Dernière revue — 2026-10-04