Arabie saoudite — Le Pakistan et le Golfe

Synthèse

Two instruments, eleven months apart. On 17 September 2025 the Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister and the Pakistani Prime Minister signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement in Riyadh; the governments' own statement said that aggression against either country would be considered aggression against both. On 11 April 2026 the Saudi Ministry of Defense announced the arrival of a Pakistani military force, including fighter and support aircraft, at King Abdulaziz Air Base in the Eastern Sector, stating in terms that the deployment was made in accordance with that agreement. On 7 August 2026 the same two leaders signed the Makkah Joint Defence Agreement alongside the Turkish President; the summit joint statement says an armed attack against any one of the three shall be regarded as an attack against them all. On 31 August the three states' foreign ministers, defence ministers and chiefs of general staff met in Istanbul as the agreement's Strategic Political and Defence Committee and agreed to establish a Secretariat in Saudi Arabia, with Pakistan providing the first Secretary General for three years. On 23 September Pakistan announced that holder, retired Lieutenant General Nauman Mahmood, for a Secretariat being established in Riyadh; on 25 September the three chiefs of staff met in Riyadh, at their foreign ministers' direction, to explore ways to assist Saudi Arabia under the Makkah agreement, and pledged intelligence cooperation, military coordination and the integration of defence capabilities. That meeting was the first consultation held under the agreement; no invocation, force contribution or command arrangement was announced. On 5 October the agreement's committee, in emergency session in Riyadh, decided to implement the collective-defence commitments and to provide the agreed forces and capabilities for rapid deployment in the kingdom, under approved arrangements that are not published, and formally appointed the Secretary General; it named no force or mission. The 2025 bilateral text has not been published. The Makkah text submitted with Türkiye's approval bill was published by the press on 20 and 21 October 2026: its Article 2 obliges assistance against an armed attack by "another country or a group of countries", each party deciding the extent of its support, and under Article 16 it remains in force indefinitely, with withdrawal possible after ten years. No response procedure under either instrument has been published.

Pourquoi c’est important

This is the relationship most likely to be misread during an attack on Saudi Arabia, because Pakistani forces are in the kingdom and a collective-defence agreement exists, and the two facts have different origins. The deployment was announced under the 2025 bilateral instrument four months before the trilateral one was signed. Any claim that the Makkah agreement has become operational therefore has to identify activity attributable to that agreement, rather than observe a presence that predates it.

Accords

• Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement (Saudi Arabia – Pakistan) · signé le 2025-09-17

  Signed in Riyadh. The governments' statement described aggression against either as aggression against both. No text has been published. This is the instrument the Saudi Ministry of Defense named when it announced the arrival of a Pakistani force in April 2026.

• Accord de défense commune de Makkah · signé le 2026-08-07

  Signed at Al-Safa Palace by Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan. The summit joint statement, published by all three governments, states that an armed attack against any one of the three shall be regarded as an attack against them all, that the agreement strengthens collective deterrence and that it provides for developing all aspects of defence cooperation. The text submitted with Türkiye's approval bill was published by the press in October 2026 and authenticated by unnamed Turkish and Pakistani officials; its terms are recorded on the Saudi–Turkish limb.

Événements associés

• Une force militaire pakistanaise arrive en Arabie saoudite au titre de l’accord bilatéral de 2025 11 avr. 2026

  Militaire · Diplomatique

• L’Arabie saoudite, la Turquie et le Pakistan signent l’accord de défense commune de Makkah 7 août 2026

  Diplomatique · Militaire

• Le comité politique et de défense de l’accord de Makkah se réunit pour la première fois 31 août 2026

  Diplomatique · Militaire

• Les chefs d’état-major de l’accord de Makkah se réunissent à Riyad sur le soutien à l’Arabie saoudite 23 – 25 sept. 2026

  Militaire · Diplomatique

• Le comité de l’accord de Makkah décide de mettre en œuvre ses engagements de défense collective en Arabie saoudite 5 oct. 2026

  Militaire · Diplomatique

Ce qui reste inconnu

• The 2025 bilateral text is not public. The Makkah text is public only as published by the press from Türkiye's bill; it leaves the extent of assistance to each party, and no signatory has stated who decides, on what threshold, or whether it reaches a non-state attacker.
• Whether the Makkah agreement supersedes the 2025 bilateral agreement, incorporates it or stands alongside it is described differently in different accounts and is not settled by any source read. Pakistan's foreign ministry said on 10 September 2026 that the Makkah agreement is already in force; it said nothing about the bilateral instrument's status.
• Whether any Pakistani support to Saudi Arabia after the 25 September Riyadh meeting is provided under the Makkah agreement, under the 2025 bilateral instrument, or outside both is not established; the Associated Press reported on 16 September that Pakistani officials had received no Saudi request under the Makkah agreement.
• Reuters reported on 2 October 2026, citing unnamed Pakistani officials, that Pakistan flew equipment including air-defence systems, light artillery and drones to Aden in September, and that Pakistani military advisers are with Saudi counterparts supporting Yemeni forces. No government stated this support, and none attributed it to the Makkah agreement, the 2025 bilateral instrument or anything else; it is not authored as a contribution under either.
• The size, composition and mission of the Pakistani presence beyond the April 2026 announcement are not established. Figures circulating in reporting, including a possible ceiling in the tens of thousands, are attributed to unnamed officials and are not authored here.
• Whether either agreement bears on Pakistan's nuclear status is not addressed by any source read, and this module makes no claim about it.
• The agreement is trilateral; its Türkiye–Pakistan limb is outside this module's boundary and is not authored.