Liban — Hezbollah

Podsumowanie

On 5 August 2025 the cabinet tasked the army with a plan to confine arms, before the end of the year, solely to the forces listed in the 2024 cessation of hostilities. On 7 August it approved the objectives of a US paper, among them the gradual ending of the armed presence of all non-state actors, "including Hezbollah", across Lebanese territory south and north of the Litani; it approved the objectives only, not timelines. On 5 September it welcomed and took note of the army's phased plan and kept its content secret. The army reported its first phase, south of the Litani, complete in January 2026, except in areas Israel held; on 16 February the cabinet took note of a second phase, which the information minister described as four months, extendable. On 2 March 2026, as Hezbollah entered the war, the cabinet decided an immediate ban on all its security and military activities as unlawful, obliged it to hand its weapons to the state and confine itself to politics, and instructed the army to implement the plan north of the Litani. Hezbollah rejected the decision, according to the UN, and its ministers stayed in the government. In the June 2026 Framework the state undertook to achieve the verified disarmament of all non-state armed groups anywhere in Lebanon. In October 2026 the two accounts met over one object: on 15 October a Hezbollah MP said of an explosives consignment the state had seized at the Dahr al-Baidar checkpoint that "the vehicle and its cargo belong to the resistance" and demanded its return; on 20 October a judge summoned two Hezbollah officials for questioning, according to a judicial official quoted by AFP; and on 22 October the cabinet postponed referring the case to the Judicial Council until the investigations are complete. On 30 October the Government Commissioner to the Military Court charged 13 people with offences against state security and under the arms law, two in custody and eleven in absentia, according to the state news agency; MTV named two of them as Hezbollah security officials. The charge sheet was not read, and no state text read names Hezbollah as the consignment's owner.

Dlaczego to ważne

The whole Israel–Lebanon sequence — Israeli withdrawal against verified disarmament — runs through this relationship, and it is the one the Lebanese state cannot settle by signature. A state that has outlawed a party's arms and governs with it is the condition every external actor is reading.

What is disputed

What the relationship is. The Lebanese government's position, in its own decisions of 5 and 7 August 2025 and 2 March 2026, is that Hezbollah's security and military activities are unlawful and that arms belong to the state alone throughout Lebanon. Hezbollah's position is that it rejects those decisions — it called the August decision a "grave sin" and rejected the March ban — and that the 2024 cessation's disarmament terms apply only south of the Litani; Israel holds that they apply to all of Lebanon. The army reports progress south of the Litani; Israel disputes that Hezbollah was disarmed there. No source read establishes the state's enforcement.

Credible sources actively disagree about this relationship. That is a stronger statement than weak evidence, and it is not softened here.

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Organizacje

Struktury, przez które działa ta relacja. Nie są jej stronami — stronami są dwaj aktorzy wymienieni powyżej.

Co pozostaje nieznane

• The army's plan is secret by cabinet decision; its phases, geography and progress are known only from the army's and ministers' statements.
• No source read establishes whether the 2 March 2026 ban has been enforced against any Hezbollah weapons or personnel beyond the Dahr al-Baidar seizure, which the state has not attributed in its own name; the 30 October charges are known through the state news agency and MTV as relayed by Naharnet, and the charge sheet was not read. The seizure is dated 5 October 2026 by Al Jazeera and 8 October by AFP; no Lebanese official text giving the date has been read.
• The published Arabic text of the 7 August 2025 objectives omits items 8 and 9; why is not stated.

Inne odczytania, które przesłanki również dopuszczają

• The decisions can be read as a state reclaiming its monopoly of force step by step, or as commitments made to outside actors that the state lacks the means or the consensus to carry out. The information minister's statement that the army will execute the plan "according to available capabilities" is consistent with both.

Wymienione, ponieważ ocena zawarta we wpisie nie jest jedyną, na jaką pozwalają jego źródła — a nie jako zastrzeżenie osłabiające powyższą ocenę.