BM-21 Grad

Fiche

Pertinence pour les conflits

Ceci est la fiche unique du catalogue pour ce système. Il est pertinent pour les modules ci-dessous ; le Force Atlas de chaque module montre comment il y est employé.

Opérateurs

Ukraine: Inherited in large numbers and the standard rocket artillery of Ukrainian brigades throughout the war; rockets sourced from allied Soviet-era stocks and from new production abroad. Losses visually documented. · Russia: The Russian ground forces' most numerous rocket launcher; documented across the front since 2022, including in the shelling of cities. · Malian Armed Forces (FAMa): Small holdings; employment reported in hub defence. No count recorded. · Armenia: Legacy holdings; employment documented across the Karabakh wars. · Azerbaijan: Legacy holdings; employment documented across the Karabakh wars.

Rôle sur le champ de bataille

Area suppression by salvo. In Ukraine it is the volume rocket artillery of both armies; in the Caucasus it was the legacy area-fire weapon of both sides across the Karabakh wars; in Mali, small holdings add weight to the defence of garrison hubs. Its inaccuracy is the standing concern wherever it is fired near settlements.

Typical employment

Battery salvos against area targets — assembly areas, trench lines, approach routes — followed by immediate displacement. In Ukraine the drone threat has pushed both sides toward single-vehicle fire from cover rather than massed batteries.

How the system is commonly used, at the level of published analysis — never a procedure, a loadout or an engagement envelope.

Points forts

A full salvo of forty rockets in about twenty seconds from a vehicle that can be driven by a conscript and reloaded by hand; ammunition made in many countries; simple enough to keep in service for six decades.

Limites

Unguided rockets with wide dispersion: effective against area targets and indiscriminate near civilians, which is why its use in and around towns recurs in every module's civilian-harm reporting. A salvo reveals the launcher, and in the drone-observed Ukrainian war that has made the type a routine counter-battery victim.

Pertinence pour les campagnes

Dérivé : une organisation participant à ces campagnes porte une association d’équipement typée avec ce système. Ce n’est pas la même chose qu’un emploi documenté du système dans la campagne elle-même.

• Le conflit du Karabakh, 1988–2023 February 1988 – September 2023

  via Armenian Ground Forces (Documented, moderate confidence)

• Campagne de blocus du carburant du JNIM Declared September 2025; eased and reimposed since

  via Malian Army (Armée de Terre) (Documented)

Identification visuelle

A rectangular block of forty tubes in four rows on the rear of a 6×6 Ural truck, elevated as one unit; the bare tube bundle without a pod or armour separates it from HIMARS and from the larger Smerch and Uragan.

Emploi documenté dans les conflits

UKRAINE–RUSSIA. Documented on both sides from the first days of 2022; open-source trackers record losses of launchers in the hundreds across the war, and the type appears in Ukrainian and Russian reporting of strikes on towns along the whole front. Rocket supply for Ukraine has depended on allied Soviet-era stocks and new foreign production. CAUCASUS. Employed by both Armenian and Azerbaijani forces in the 1990s war and in 2020, including documented fire against populated areas on both sides. SAHEL. Small Malian holdings reported at garrison hubs; no employment in the 2026 offensives is documented from open sources.

Opérateurs par composante et par service

• Armenian Ground Forces Documenté
• Azerbaijani Land Forces Documenté
• Malian Army (Armée de Terre) Documenté