La fiche Ce qu’est ce système, d’où il vient, qui le met en œuvre et pour quels modules de Vigil il est pertinent — avec les éléments sur lesquels repose chacun de ces points.
Fiche
Pertinence pour les conflits
Ceci est la fiche unique du catalogue pour ce système. Il est pertinent pour les modules ci-dessous ; le Force Atlas de chaque module montre comment il y est employé.
Opérateurs
Ukraine: The inherited backbone of Ukraine's long-range air defence in 2022 and still a large part of it; interceptor supply is the constraint, since the missiles are no longer produced for Ukraine and were sourced from allied Soviet-era stocks. Documented losses of launchers and radars throughout the war. · Russia: Fielded across the Aerospace Forces' air-defence formations; S-300 series missiles have also been fired in a surface-to-surface role against Ukrainian cities since 2022, a use documented by Ukrainian authorities and open-source analysts. · Iran and the Gulf: S-300PMU-2 batteries delivered by Russia in 2016 after a six-year freeze, operated by the Artesh Air Defence Force; their condition after the 2025 and 2026 campaigns is not established. · Armenia: Backbone of Armenian long-range air defence into 2020; multiple components visually documented as destroyed by drones and loitering munitions during the war. · Azerbaijan: Acquired S-300PMU-2 from Russia in the 2010s; not the system the 2020 air campaign turned on.
Rôle sur le champ de bataille
Long-range, high-altitude area air defence — designed against aircraft and cruise missiles, structurally challenged by small, slow, cheap unmanned systems attacking the radars it cannot fight without.
Points forts
Genuine long-range reach against conventional air threats; mobility by design; the reason manned airpower played a marginal role in the Karabakh wars.
Limites
The 2020 record is the point: radars that must emit to matter were found and killed by anti-radiation loitering munitions and TB2-directed fires, with losses visually documented — a capability lesson that reshaped air defence thinking well beyond the region.
Pertinence pour les campagnes
Dérivé : une organisation participant à ces campagnes porte une association d’équipement typée avec ce système. Ce n’est pas la même chose qu’un emploi documenté du système dans la campagne elle-même.
- Le conflit du Karabakh, 1988–2023 February 1988 – September 2023
via Armenian Armed Forces (Historically associated, high confidence); Azerbaijani Air Force (Documented)
- Le processus de normalisation Arménie–Azerbaïdjan Since November 2020
via Armenian Armed Forces (Historically associated, high confidence)
- La campagne stratégique contre le système électrique ukrainien Since October 2022
via Aerospace Forces (VKS) (Documented, high confidence)
Identification visuelle
Tube quads on 5P85 transporter-erector-launchers, large phased-array engagement radar, distinctive mast-mounted low-altitude radar on some batteries.
Emploi documenté dans les conflits
CAUCASUS. Armenian S-300 components (launchers, radars) documented destroyed in Azerbaijani strike footage and independent OSINT counts during the 2020 war. For that module the record is historical context for the capability story, not an inventory of current holdings. UKRAINE–RUSSIA. The family is in active service on both sides. For Ukraine it was the long-range layer that held the sky in 2022 and remains a large part of the air-defence order of battle beneath the donated Western systems; its interceptors are a finite Soviet-era stock topped up from allied inventories, which is why the module's air-defence layer treats interceptor supply rather than launcher count as the variable. Russia has used S-300 missiles as ground-attack weapons against Kharkiv and other cities since 2022 — an inaccurate use documented by Ukrainian authorities and open-source analysts. Losses of launchers and radars on both sides are visually documented. No holdings or battery locations are stated. MIDDLE EAST. Iran's S-300PMU-2 batteries are recorded as capability context; their condition after the 2025 and 2026 campaigns is not established.
Opérateurs par composante et par service
- Armenian Air Force and Air Defence Associé historiquement
- Armenian Armed Forces Associé historiquement
- Azerbaijani Air Force Documenté
- Artesh Air Defence Force Documenté
- Aerospace Forces (VKS) Documenté
Évalué au — 2026-06 Dernière revue — 2026-10-29