ASSESSMENT 001 · IRAN–GULF · ENERGY, INFRASTRUCTURE AND COMMERCIAL RESILIENCE

Gulf Energy Under Pressure

Alternative export routes, infrastructure dependencies and the limits of commercial resilience

PUBLISHED	ASSESSED AS OF	RESEARCH REVIEWED	OVERALL CONFIDENCE	SCOPE
29 October 2026	28 October 2026	29 October 2026	MODERATE	Gulf crude and LNG exits, Feb–Oct 2026

Independent research specimen. Prepared by Vigil Consilium to demonstrate its assessment format. Not commissioned by an external client.

THE QUESTION

How resilient are alternative Gulf energy export routes when maritime access, infrastructure reliability and regional security conditions deteriorate?

JUDGMENT

Partially, nationally and only for crude oil. The Gulf's alternative routes are physically real and in 2026 they worked: Saudi Arabia's East–West pipeline was carrying 5.8 million barrels a day in early October, by the energy minister's account, after being struck. They are still not a substitute for Hormuz. Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have material ones, liquefied gas has none, and what they deliver to buyers is capped below the pipeline's own capacity by terminals, domestic demand, a second contested sea lane, ships and insurance.

Under sustained deterioration, the routes keep two producers exporting reduced volumes. They do not keep the region's energy reaching market on commercial terms. Their resilience is decided by the narrowest downstream link and by whether the alternative shares the primary route's threats. In 2026 it did.

FINDING 01

Pipeline throughput is not export capacity.

The East–West line carried 5.8 mb/d on 6 October, by the energy minister's account.[1] Yanbu's crude exports in the first half of October averaged about 2.34 mb/d, according to Kpler data.[2] Before the war, 1.5–2 mb/d of the line's flow went to refineries, power and desalination.[1] The binding limits sit downstream of the pipe.

FINDING 02

The alternative shares the risks it is meant to avoid.

The Red Sea outlet came under a declared Houthi blockade of Saudi-linked shipping in July.[3] The Houthis claimed a missile strike on a Saudi tanker 63 nautical miles off Yanbu in August,[4] and the war-risk listed area on the Saudi Red Sea coast was extended north to 25.5°N.[5] On 10 September, by Saudi Arabia's account, drones from Iraq struck the line's pumping stations.[1,6] Redundancy that shares a threat environment is not independent.

FINDING 03

Resilience is national, crude-only, and still runs partly through the strait.

Only Saudi Arabia and the UAE have bypasses of material size; Iraq's line to Türkiye carries a fraction of its exports.[7,8] Kuwaiti and Qatari crude exports were zero from April to June.[9] Qatar's LNG has no alternative route.[10] In September, 60% of non-Iranian Gulf crude still crossed Hormuz, mostly on shuttle tankers.[11]

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS

- **Treat stated bypass capacity as an upper bound.** The operative figure is terminal loadings, which commercial trackers report and which disagree with each other.
- **Do not model the Red Sea and Hormuz as independent risks.** In 2026 a stress case that closed one and left the other open was not the case that occurred.
- **Read normalisation from insurance, not volume.** Volumes returned in September while commercial access did not.

CONFIDENCE MODERATE

The infrastructure facts and official statements are high-confidence. Flows come from commercial trackers that disagree, and no operator has published a damage assessment.


Principal uncertainty: no published figure shows where the pipeline's 5.8 mb/d goes, so the gap to Yanbu's exports cannot be fully explained.

02 / SITUATION AND EVIDENCE

Two producers have a way out. The rest of the Gulf does not.

Before the war, about 20 mb/d of crude oil and products passed through Hormuz, roughly a fifth of world liquids consumption.[12,13] On 28 February 2026 Iran declared the strait closed. It was never physically sealed. What closed it was commercial: insurers cancelled war-risk extensions from 5 March and tanker transits fell by more than 80%.[14,15]

FIGURE 1 Where Gulf energy leaves, and the two lines that avoid the strait



SHOWS Export terminals and processing nodes (black), the two bypass outlets (amber), the two chokepoints, and the two operational bypass pipelines drawn endpoint to endpoint. The red mark at 25.5°N is the northern limit of the Joint War Committee listed area on the Saudi Red Sea coast since 29 July 2026.

BASIS Coordinates from Vigil location records; Basra terminal position approximate. Pipeline lengths from public descriptions. Listed-area limit from a secondary relay of JWC circular JWLA-034.[5] Geography: Natural Earth 1:50m.

LIMITS Pipelines are schematic: real endpoints, no traced route, no pumping stations. Power and desalination plants are not shown by rule. Yanbu falling inside the listed area is inferred from the 25.5°N limit.


PRODUCER	EXIT AVOIDING HORMUZ	CAPACITY	2026 EVIDENCE
Saudi Arabia	East–West line, Abqaiq to Yanbu	5 mb/d design; 7 reported, not sustainably tested[7] CAPACITY · IEA	Shut after the 10 Sep strike; 5.8 mb/d by 6 Oct (minister). Yanbu exports ~2.34 mb/d, 1–15 Oct.[1,2,16]
UAE	ADCOP, Habshan to Fujairah	1.5 mb/d nameplate; operating 1.7–1.8[17] CAPACITY · ARGUS, IEA	Fujairah loadings rose from 1.1 to 2.7 mb/d, above pipeline capacity; the excess implies shuttled crude or stock draw.[11,18] Storage hit four times; loadings resumed within a day.[19]
Iraq	Kirkuk–Ceyhan to Türkiye	~1.6 mb/d nameplate CAPACITY · ARGUS, VIA BREAKWAVE	About 0.22 mb/d, Oct 2025 – Feb 2026,[8] against total Iraqi crude exports of 3.77 mb/d in January.[9]
Iran	Goreh–Jask	1 mb/d design; ~0.3 effective[12] CAPACITY · EIA	"Effectively non-operational" (IEA).[7,20]
Kuwait · Bahrain	NONE	—	Kuwaiti crude exports 1.19 mb/d in January, zero from April to June.[9]
Qatar	NONE FOR CRUDE OR LNG	—	About a fifth of world LNG passed Hormuz in 2025.[7] Two of 14 trains damaged on 18 March.[10]

03 / CORE MECHANISM

A barrel needs more than a pipe to leave by the side door

An alternative route is a chain: processing, pipeline, the domestic users it also feeds, a terminal, a sea lane, ships and cover. Its resilience is set by the narrowest link and by the slowest repair. The Saudi route, the larger of the two, shows each link binding in turn.

FIGURE 2 The Saudi bypass: six different numbers for one route



SHOWS Six published figures for the East–West route, each labelled by the kind of quantity it is. Capacity is what the line is designed or claimed to carry; flow is what moved, at a stated date; availability is what the terminal can physically load; dependency is the domestic demand the line must serve before anything is exported.

BASIS IEA factsheet (Feb 2026); Argus and Al Jazeera on the minister's 6 October statement; Reuters ship-tracking estimate; Kpler data relayed by Okaz.[1,2,7,21,22]

LIMITS Not a flow balance. The figures have different dates and definitions and do not sum. No published figure splits the 5.8 mb/d between refineries, power, storage and exports. Trackers disagree on Yanbu volumes.

THE TERMINAL AND THE DOMESTIC SYSTEM BIND FIRST

The pipeline was not the constraint in October; what lay downstream of it was. Yanbu's loading ceiling is estimated near 4.5 mb/d,[22] in March, market sources put its wartime rate nearer 3, though Wood Mackenzie tracked March exports at 4.07.[9,23] The line also feeds Red Sea refineries, power and desalination, and the 400,000 b/d Jazan refinery was shut after an attack in September.[1] Expansion plans, including a 1.2 mb/d gas-line conversion and a 10 mb/d target, add pipeline capacity, not loading capacity;[22] the UAE's second line, due in 2027, would take ADCOP to about 3.3 mb/d.[24] VIGIL ASSESSMENT

NODE TYPE SETS THE RECOVERY CLOCK

The routes were struck repeatedly; what mattered was how long each kind of node took to return (Table 1). Storage and loading recovered in a day. Pumping stations took days to weeks, with no operator damage assessment published.[1,25] Liquefaction trains take years. A bypass struck at its pumping stations is as reliable as its least-protected station, and Argus understands one was damaged again on 24–25 October, with limited effect.[26] VIGIL ASSESSMENT

THE ALTERNATIVE SEA LANE IS COUPLED TO THE FIRST

Saudi Red Sea exports depend on Bab el-Mandeb for Asian buyers. The alternative via Suez extends a voyage to South Korea from about 24 to 54 days.[27] The same regional conflict produced the Houthi blockade of Saudi-linked shipping, attacks on Red Sea refineries and the listed-area extension. UKMTO, via Vigil's Watch, has recorded no attack on Red Sea shipping since 24 August.[28] The pressure on this lane has therefore been commercial and onshore rather than interdiction at sea. VIGIL ASSESSMENT

TABLE 1 Recovery time by type of node, 2026

NODE	OBSERVED RECOVERY
Storage and loading Fujairah, 14 Mar	~1 day
Restart after 10 Sep strike energy minister's account	5–6 days
Restart after 10 Sep strike Reuters, three sources	12 days
Back to 5.8 mb/d same line, stated 6 Oct	≤26 days
Refinery Ras Tanura, early Mar	>3 months
LNG trains Ras Laffan, operator estimate	~3 years

BASIS Vigil Tempo series; Argus (6 and 27 Oct); Reuters via Vigil; QatarEnergy CEO, 21 Sep.[1,16,19,26,29]

LIMITS The two September restart figures disagree and are shown separately. UNRESOLVED Durations are as reported, not audited.

04 / IMPLICATIONS AND OBSERVABLES

Operable is not the same as commercially resilient

VOLUME CAME BACK; ACCESS DID NOT

By September, Gulf crude exports excluding Iran had returned to at least their pre-war level, about 16.5 mb/d, but by changed routes.[11] Most of it still crossed the strait, mostly on shuttle tankers transferring cargoes off Fujairah and Sohar, with US-facilitated transits.[11,30] The arrangement proved fragile. After a surge of attacks in early October, at least 28 in the first half of the month by Lloyd's List Intelligence's count,[31] crude crossings fell by about a quarter in a week, and in the week to 21 October combined transits were still about 70% below pre-conflict levels.[30,32] ATTRIBUTED

Cover has remained available "for a price", but the war-risk listing will not be lifted without sustained incident-free passage, a settled political position and completed mine clearance.[33] A US$40 billion public reinsurance facility had provided no cover by August.[13] EIA's October outlook assumes flows through the strait stay constrained through the fourth quarter.[34] Volume moved under escort and at elevated cost: an operable system, not a commercially normal one. VIGIL ASSESSMENT

WHAT THIS MEANS FOR THE QUESTION

For energy-risk analysis, the right unit is a producer's whole export chain, not its pipeline. A stress case should hold Hormuz and the Red Sea together, apply each link's recovery clock, and treat the IEA's 3.5–5.5 mb/d for what it is: spare capacity on the Saudi and Emirati lines, on top of about 3 mb/d already in use, not a regional total.[7]

For gas exposure, nothing substitutes. The two damaged trains hold about 17% of Qatar's capacity;[10] QatarEnergy says they need three years, and that pipelines "make no economic sense".[29]

CONDITIONAL PATHWAYS

A · STRAIT STAYS CLOSED, RED SEA QUIET

CONDITIONAL

Saudi and Emirati crude moves at terminal-limited rates; everyone else depends on escorted shuttles.

WOULD BE SHOWN BY

steady Yanbu and Fujairah loadings with no Red Sea incident.

B · CORRELATED DETERIORATION

CONDITIONAL

Red Sea interdiction and further pumping-station strikes remove the bypass's value at the moment it is most needed.

WOULD BE SHOWN BY

a confirmed attack on shipping off Yanbu, or the line offline for more than two weeks.

C · COMMERCIAL REOPENING

CONDITIONAL

Cover is written on terms charterers accept; flows return to the strait and the bypass goes back to reserve. LNG stays capped by damaged trains.

WOULD BE SHOWN BY

the war-risk listing being narrowed or lifted.

Pathways are conditions, not forecasts. No likelihood is assigned.

OBSERVABLES THAT WOULD CHANGE THIS ASSESSMENT

01 **War-risk cover written for Hormuz transits** on terms charterers take up, or the listed area narrowed.[32]
COMMERCIAL ACCESS RETURNING · PATHWAY C

02 **An operator or ministry figure for Yanbu loadings**, or tracker consensus above 3 mb/d sustained for a month.
TESTS FINDING 01 · TERMINAL CONSTRAINT EASING

03 **A confirmed attack on shipping in the Red Sea or at Yanbu**, the first since 24 August.[28]
STRENGTHENS FINDING 02 · PATHWAY B

04 **A published damage assessment for the East–West pumping stations**, or a further outage longer than two weeks.
RECALIBRATES THE RECOVERY CLOCK

05 **The gas-line conversion delivering its 1.2 mb/d**, and whether loadings rise with it.
CAPACITY VERSUS TERMINAL TEST

06 **Qatari LNG loadings resuming at volume**, or a revised repair timeline for the damaged trains.
TESTS FINDING 03 FOR GAS

WHAT THIS ASSESSMENT CANNOT CONCLUDE

It cannot apportion the pipeline's flow between exports and domestic use, because no split is published. It cannot reconcile trackers' Yanbu volumes; they use different definitions. It publishes no insurance multiplier, because the pre-war premium baseline is disputed. It does not assess the vulnerability of specific installations or their power supply, by design.

05 / EVIDENCE REGISTER

Every source cited, in citation order

34 SOURCES · 12 VIGIL RECORD · 4 OFFICIAL / PRIMARY · 4 RESEARCH / DATA · 14 REPORTING

1 REPORTING **Argus** (2026-10-06). Saudi east–west pipeline at 5.8mn b/d: energy minister. www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2887089-saudi-east-west-pipeline-at-5.8mn-b-d-energy-minister

2 REPORTING **Okaz (relaying Kpler data via Asharq Bloomberg)** (2026-10-19). Saudi crude exports by terminal, September and 1–15 October 2026. www.okaz.com.sa/economy/na/2271484

3 REPORTING **Al Jazeera** (2026-07-20). Yemen's Houthis declare naval blockade of Saudi Arabia: what to know. www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/7/20/yemens-houthis-declare-naval-blockade-of-saudi-arabia-what-to-know

4 REPORTING **Al Jazeera** (2026-08-24). Yemen's Houthis report attack on Saudi ship. www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/8/24/yemens-houthis-report-attack-on-saudi-ship

5 REPORTING **NNPC Marine** (2026-08-03). Update: Joint War Committee amends listed areas including Saudi Arabia (JWLA-034). nnpc-marine.com/update-joint-war-committee-amends-listed-areas-including-saudi-arabia/
Secondary relay of the JWC circular; the circular itself was not opened.

6 REPORTING **Al Jazeera** (2026-09-11). Saudi Arabia says East–West pipeline hit by drones launched from Iraq. www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/9/11/saudi-arabia-says-east-west-pipeline-hit-by-drones-launched-from-iraq

7 OFFICIAL / PRIMARY **International Energy Agency** (updated 2026-02). Strait of Hormuz factsheet (bypass capacity, LNG transit shares). www.iea.org/about/oil-security-and-emergency-response/strait-of-hormuz

8 RESEARCH / DATA **Breakwave Advisors (Vortexa data)** (2026-06-23). Iraq's export crisis: Hormuz and pipeline uncertainty. www.breakwaveadvisors.com/insights/2026/6/23/iraqs-export-crisis-hormuz-and-pipeline-uncertainty

9 RESEARCH / DATA **Wood Mackenzie** (2026-07-24). Saudi Arabia's Red Sea crude bypass peaks in March and declines 41% by June. www.woodmac.com/press-releases/saudi-arabias-red-sea-crude-bypass-peaks-in-march-and-declines-41-by-june/

10 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-04). Logistics record: Qatar LNG exports ("no bypass"). vigilconsilium.com/conflicts/iran-gulf/logistics/iran-gulf-qatar-lng-exports/

11 RESEARCH / DATA **Kpler** (2026-09). Explainer: how Mideast Gulf crude exports returned to pre-war levels (data to 28 Sep 2026). www.kpler.com/blog/explainer-how-mideast-gulf-crude-exports-returned-to-pre-war-levels

12 OFFICIAL / PRIMARY **US Energy Information Administration** (2025-06-16). Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint (Today in Energy). www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504

13 OFFICIAL / PRIMARY **Congressional Research Service** (updated 2026-08-07). Strait of Hormuz: Background and Issues for Congress (R45281). www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R45281.html

14 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (2026-09-04). Analytical Note: The strait that closed without being blocked (legal, physical and commercial access). vigilconsilium.com/notes/iran-gulf-strait-that-closed/

15 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-09-04). Impact chain: commercial closure (P&I notices effective 5 March 2026; no premium multiplier published). vigilconsilium.com/conflicts/iran-gulf/impact-chains/iran-gulf-commercial-closure/

16 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-04). Logistics record: Saudi east–west transit ("limited by its terminal rather than by its pipeline"). vigilconsilium.com/conflicts/iran-gulf/logistics/iran-gulf-saudi-east-west-transit/
Predates the 6 October ministerial throughput statement; flagged for update in the research log.

17 REPORTING **Argus** (2026-05-15). UAE speeds up Fujairah crude export capacity expansion. www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2827434-uae-speeds-up-fujairah-crude-export-capacity-expansion

18 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-09-04). Logistics record: UAE Fujairah access (ADCOP). vigilconsilium.com/conflicts/iran-gulf/logistics/iran-gulf-uae-fujairah-access/
Its capacity and handling figures are superseded here by IEA and Argus; flagged in the research log.

19 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-28). Iran–Gulf map: energy-infrastructure strikes Tempo series, 28 Feb – 26 Oct 2026 (counts reports, "never damage, duration or effect"). vigilconsilium.com/map/iran-gulf/

20 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-04). Logistics record: Iranian export system (Kharg; Goreh–Jask). vigilconsilium.com/conflicts/iran-gulf/logistics/iran-gulf-iranian-export-system/

21 REPORTING **Al Jazeera** (2026-10-06). Saudi Arabia says East–West pipeline pumping 5.8 million bpd. www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/10/6/saudi-arabia-says-east-west-pipeline-pumping-5-8-million-bpd

22 REPORTING **Investinglive (relaying Reuters)** (2026-10). Saudi Arabia eyes 1.2 million bpd pipeline boost within weeks by converting gas line. investinglive.com/commodities/saudi-arabia-eyes-1-2-million-bpd-pipeline-boost-within-weeks-by-converting-gas-line/

23 REPORTING **Engineering News-Record** (2026-03-13). Hormuz bypass infrastructure was sized for a short disruption. This is not that.. www.enr.com/articles/62677-hormuz-bypass-infrastructure-was-sized-for-a-short-disruption-this-is-not-that

24 REPORTING **gCaptain (relaying Bloomberg)** (2026-05-15). UAE will double oil export capacity bypassing Hormuz by 2027. gcaptain.com/uae-will-double-oil-export-capacity-bypassing-hormuz-by-2027/

25 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-25). Watch: Gulf energy nodes under strike. Review ledger to 25 Oct 2026. vigilconsilium.com/watch/iran-gulf/gulf-energy-nodes-under-strike/

26 REPORTING **Argus** (2026-10-27). Fire reported near Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura complex (incl. further pumping-station damage, 24–25 Oct). www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2896184-fire-reported-near-saudi-arabia-s-ras-tanura-complex

27 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-09-04). Impact chain: Red Sea rerouting ("the two straits behave as one coupled system"). vigilconsilium.com/conflicts/iran-gulf/impact-chains/iran-gulf-red-sea-rerouting/

28 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-25). Watch: Bab el-Mandeb access (no attack on Red Sea shipping recorded since 24 Aug; transits 22% below pre-blockade). vigilconsilium.com/watch/iran-gulf/bab-el-mandeb-access/

29 REPORTING **Trend News Agency** (2026-09-21). QatarEnergy chief: damaged LNG trains need three years to repair. www.trend.az/world/arab/4226214.html

30 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-04). Logistics record: Hormuz crude exports (2025 baseline; 2026 disruption entries). vigilconsilium.com/conflicts/iran-gulf/logistics/iran-gulf-hormuz-crude-exports/

31 RESEARCH / DATA **Lloyd's List Intelligence** (2026-10-22). Strait of Hormuz brief, 22 October 2026. www.lloydslistintelligence.com/resources/blog/strait-of-hormuz-brief-22-october-2026

32 VIGIL RECORD **Vigil Consilium** (reviewed 2026-10-25). Watch: Hormuz commercial access. Review ledger to 25 Oct 2026 (UKMTO weekly transit counts; strikes on the southern route). vigilconsilium.com/watch/iran-gulf/hormuz-commercial-access/

33 REPORTING **Insurance Business** (2026-08-26). Trump says Hormuz is clear — the insurance market disagrees. www.insurancebusinessmag.com/us/news/marine/trump-says-hormuz-is-clear--the-insurance-market-disagrees-587552.aspx

34 OFFICIAL / PRIMARY **US Energy Information Administration** (2026-10-06). Short-Term Energy Outlook, October 2026 (forecast; vintage 6 Oct 2026). www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/

06 / METHOD AND LIMITATIONS

How the judgment was reached, and where it is weakest

The assessment began from Vigil's Iran–Gulf records: logistics, impact chains, Watch ledgers, the energy-infrastructure Tempo series and the Note on commercial closure. Load-bearing figures were re-checked at their primary or institutional source wherever it could be opened, and the October 2026 position was brought up to date from official statements, data providers and trade reporting. Figures carried from Vigil's records without re-reading are listed as such in the research log.

FIVE QUANTITIES, KEPT APART

Every number is labelled as **capacity** (designed or claimed), **availability** (usable now), **flow** (what moved, at a stated date), **dependency** (what a flow cannot do without, or what has no alternative) or **scenario**. Shares state what they are shares of. Forecasts carry their vintage. Tracker figures are reported as such: they are commercial estimates with differing definitions, not operator data.

WHAT WAS EXCLUDED, AND WHY

A combined "all alternatives" bypass figure, because the institutional source describes the familiar 3.5–5.5 mb/d as spare capacity on two lines only. **An insurance multiplier**, because the pre-war baseline is disputed. **Installation-level vulnerability**, including the power supply of pumping stations, by design. **Attribution** of the September pipeline strike beyond the Saudi government's statement: other accounts differ.

WHERE THIS DEPARTS FROM VIGIL'S OWN RECORDS

The research found that several canonical records predate the October evidence. They do not yet carry the minister's 5.8 mb/d statement or QatarEnergy's three-year repair estimate, which replaces "up to five years". They give the ADCOP nameplate and operating figures the wrong way round, and they describe the 3.5–5.5 mb/d figure as a total rather than as spare capacity. This assessment uses the newer primary evidence; the corrections are listed in the research log for Vigil's review cycle.

TABLE 2 Source quality of the claims the judgment leans on most

CLAIM	BASIS	GRADE	QUALIFICATION
East–West line carrying 5.8 mb/d, 6 Oct	Saudi energy minister, via Argus and Al Jazeera	HIGH	Official statement of flow; not independently measured.
Yanbu crude exports ~2.34 mb/d, 1–15 Oct	Kpler data, relayed by Okaz	MODERATE	Tracker estimate; other trackers use other definitions.
Domestic offtake 1.5–2 mb/d	Argus, pre-war	MODERATE	Pre-war figure; wartime split unpublished.
Only Saudi Arabia and UAE have material bypasses	IEA factsheet; CRS	HIGH	Iraq's Ceyhan line is operational but marginal in volume.
60% of Sept crude crossed Hormuz, mostly on shuttles	Kpler explainer	MODERATE	"At least" figures; minimum confirmed volumes.
Listed area extended to 25.5°N	JWC circular via NNPC Marine	MODERATE	Secondary relay; the circular was not opened.
Ras Laffan trains need three years	QatarEnergy CEO, via Trend	MODERATE	Operator estimate; supersedes March "up to five years".

DATES AND REVIEW BASIS

Published 29 October 2026. **Assessed as of** 28 October 2026, the date of Vigil's last Iran–Gulf series review. **Research reviewed** 29 October 2026, when supplementary sources were opened. Each figure carries its own date. Figures with different dates or definitions are never summed or treated as a range.

CONVENTIONS

Evidence status:
ESTABLISHED | ATTRIBUTED | VIGIL ASSESSMENT | UNRESOLVED | CONDITIONAL

Confidence: High: independent credible sources agree. Moderate: credible sourcing with known gaps. Low: contested or single-sourced.

Independent research specimen. Prepared by Vigil Consilium to demonstrate its assessment format. Not commissioned by an external client. Nothing here is investment advice. No classified, proprietary or client information was used.